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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a30) (1953 as amended).1
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from final orders of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Tyrone Medley, on March 12, 1998, January
29, 1999 and re-entered on February 2, 1999. There were no other motions.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in allowing the intervention of Wagner, Mountain West

Title, and Lincoln Service Corporation?
Review of this issue would normally be made under an abuse of discretion
standard. Jenner v. Real Estate Services. 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983.) However, the Trial Court's
allowance of the intervention in this case was based on an erroneous application of law which
would be reviewed for correctness. Gremlich v. Monsen. 838 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1992).
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to enforce the settlement agreement entered into

between Plaintiffs and Defendants?
This is an issue of law which the court reviews for correctness. Gramlich v.
Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992).

hereafter all references to the Utah Code Annotated shall be to the 1953 code as amended
unless otherwise noted.
1

3.

Did the trial court err in holding that the lis pendens did not give constructive

notice to the intervenors of Plaintiffs' claim in the property at issue?
This is an issue of law which the court reviews for correctness. Gramlich v.
Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992).
4.

Did the trial court err in allowing intervenors to raise certain defenses belonging

to other parties?
This is an issue of law which the court reviews for correctness. Gramlich v.
Munsev. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein as Addendum
"B".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action had its beginnings in the theft of gold coins belonging to the Plaintiff
corporations nearly fifteen years ago. R. 2 The property was stolen by Defendant Kelly
Thomas and was subsequently was converted into other assets with the aid of various entities
created solely for that purpose. R.2-6
Among the assets in which the Plaintiffs' property was converted was a piece of real
property located in Utah County. The property was purportedly owned by Scott Collard and
Christine Lewis as trustees for the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust. R. 1699
The fact that the property itself was purchased from proceeds from the stolen gold coins
is undisputed. The facts surrounding the acquisition of the property, its ownership and location

2

were discovered after the original complaint had been filed. At that time an amended complaint
was filed naming the Trust and the individual trustees as defendants. 969-970
The Plaintiffs gave notice to all parties of their interest in the property by filing a Lis
Pendens with the Utah County Recorder's Office. The fact that the Lis Pendens was properly
filed and of record is not disputed. A short time after the Lis Pendens was filed Intervenor,
John D. Wagner, purchased the property from the Trustees of Trust. The purchase was made
although the lis pendens was a matter of public record.
The case on the original theft was scheduled to go to trial in December of 1995. Just
days before trial was to be held a settlement was entered into between all of the parties. R.2172
The settlement agreement required the surrender of all the Defendant's right, title, and interest
in the Utah County property together with the payment of a sum of money from the sale of
certain real property located in Salt Lake County, which had also been identified and covered
by a separate lis pendens. R.2173.
At the request of Robert McDonald, then counsel for all defendants excepting F. Keith
Biesinger, a form of judgment was prepared setting a dollar figure on the amount to be
recovered from the Pleasant Grove property. R.2173 The parties stipulated that the judgment
would be amended if it was not sufficient in form to enable the Plaintiff to recover against the
Utah County property. R.2173.
Shortly after the judgment was entered it became apparent that the former judgment as
prepared by Defendant's counsel would not be sufficient to meet the intention of the parties.
R.2173 Plaintiffs counsel contacted Mr. McDonald and requested that he execute the
alternate form of the judgment as had been agreed by the parties. R.2173.
3

Over the next couple of weeks several attempts were made to contact Defendant's
counsel to get the amended judgment signed. R. 2173 Finally, instead of signing the amended
judgment, Defendant's counsel withdrew as counsel for the Defendant's. Subsequently,
Defendants were contacted directly. R.2173 The Defendants individually agreed to amend the
judgment as previously had been agreed with their counsel. R.2174-R.2175 The amended
judgment was sent to both Scott Collard and Julie Thomas. The amended judgement was not
returned to Plaintiff's counsel. R.2175.
The Plaintiffs filed a separate action in Utah County seeking to enforce the judgment
against the real property. R.2174 Answers were filed on behalf of John Wagner, the title
company who had insured the transaction, and the corporation who had lent Mr. Wagner the
money to purchase the property. Appearances and defenses were also filed by the other named
defendants those being all of the defendants in this action with the exception of F. Keith
Biesinger. Plaintiffs counsel then filed a separate motion in this action seeking to amend the
judgment to conform with the stipulation of the parties. R.1661 An objection to that motion
was filed by Mr. McDonald who reappeared as counsel for all defendants except for Mr.
Biesinger. R.1687 The motion was submitted for decision on two separate occasions but no
ruling on the motion was made by the trial court. R.1685, R.1703.
In August of 1997 a motion to intervene in this action was filed by Wagner and Lincoln
Service Corporation, the Wagner's lender. R.1745 This was nearly a year after the original
memorandum to enforce the settlement agreement had been filed with the court.
On September 9, 1997 a separate motion to intervene was filed by Intervenor Mountain
West Title. R.1799 Plaintiffs objected to the motions to intervene and full briefing was made
4

by each side. Thereafter oral argument was had and on October 31, 1997 the court entered a
memorandum decision denying both motions to intervene. R.1885
On November 5, 1997 Wagner and Lincoln Service Corporation filed a motion to
reconsider. R.1892 That motion to reconsider was joined by Mountain West Title on
November 28, 1997. R.2107 A memorandum in opposition to the motion to reconsider was
filed and reply memoranda were submitted followed by notices to submit for decision to the
trial court. On December 29, 1997 Wagner and Lincoln filed a notice of appeal with the Utah
Supreme Court. Mountain West Title-likewise filed a notice to appeal on that same date.
R.2137, R.2144 Although the matter had been appealed, a hearing was held by Judge Medley
on the motions to reconsider the prior ruling. On March 12, 1998 an order was entered
granting the petitions for reconsideration and reversing the court's prior ruling which did not
allow Wagner, Lincoln, and Mountain West to intervene. R.2332
Thereafter a subsequent round of briefing was held on the additional defenses raised by
intervenors in opposition to the motion to amend and/or correct judgment filed by the
Plaintiffs. On April 20, 1998 the appeals to the Supreme Court were dismissed on the basis of
mootness. On December 17, 1998 a minute entry denying the Plaintiffs motion to amend
and/or correct judgment was entered by the court. R.2520 The final order denying Plaintiffs
motion was initially entered on January 29, 1999 and re-entered on February 2, 1999. R.2524,
R.2542 An appeal of that final decision was filed with this court within 30 days thereafter.
R.2562

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case commenced with the filing of a Verified Complaint on or about March

19, 1991.R.1
2.

The Complaint sought the recovery of property of the corporations stolen by the

Defendant Kelly Thomas. R.2
3.

Over the course of litigation, the Complaint was amended three times as

additional Defendants were identified, and the whereabouts of the Corporations' assets were
discovered. R.969, R.247, R.441
4.

The Third Amended Complaint was filed on or about October 23, 1992. R.969

5.

Beginning in 1995, the parties entered into serious settlement negotiations.

6.

Plaintiffs made a settlement offer to the Defendants on May 18, 1995, which was

R.2172

memorialized in a letter of that date directed to counsel for the Defendants. R.2172
7.

Shortly prior to the time scheduled for trial of this case, the parties finally agreed

to a stipulated settlement. R.2172
8.

Pursuant to the Agreement of the parties, Plaintiffs counsel drafted the first

proposed Order of Judgement and Stipulation. R.2172
9.

That Proposed Order of Judgment clearly identified that all the rights, interest and

title to certain property located in Utah County, formerly owned by the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Family Trust and upon which Plaintiffs had filed a Lis Pendens, were to be awarded
to Plaintiffs. R.2173
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10.

Robert McDonald, counsel for all Defendants other than Mr. F. Keith Biesinger,

stated that his clients wished the initial Order to be signed to reflect instead, a monetary value for
the judgement, as opposed to a listing of the separate property. R.2173
11.

Counsel for Plaintiffs indicated his concern that such a form of judgement might

not be sufficient to meet the settlement goals of the parties that being the surrender of all of the
Trust's rights in the property, located in Utah County. R.2173
12.

Mr. McDonald affirmed to Plaintiffs counsel that if the Judgement needed to be

amended, his clients would willingly do so in order to meet the Agreement of the parties. R.2173
13.

Judgement was formally entered by the Court on December 1, 1995 in the form

requested by Mr. McDonald. R.2173
14.

Shortly thereafter, it became evident that the Judgement in the form drafted was

not sufficient to meet the agreed upon terms of the parties, and in January of 1996, Plaintiffs
counsel submitted the Amended Judgement and Stipulation to Mr. McDonald. R.2173
15.

Mr. McDonald did not respond to the correspondence for nearly two weeks, at

which time he responded by withdrawing as counsel for the Defendants. R.2173
16.

Thereafter, correspondence was sent directly to Scott Collard and Christine Lewis,

the Trustees of the Trust, requesting that they sign the Amended Judgement as they had
previously agreed through counsel. R.2174
17.

Plaintiffs received no response. R.2174

18.

On or about May 23, 1996, a separate action was brought in the Fourth District

Court of Utah County to foreclose on the property that formerly belonged to the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Family Trust. R.2174
7

19.

Shortly after the Summons and Complaint were served on Scott Collard, Plaintiffs

counsel was contacted by Julie Thomas. R. 2174
20.

Julie Thomas asked that Plaintiffs' counsel send to her the proposed Amended

Judgement, Motion and Stipulation and affirmed that she would have the Trustees of the Trust
sign the same. R. 2174
21.

The requested documents were sent to Julie Thomas on June 18, 1996. R. 2174

22.

When Plaintiffs' counsel had not received the signed documents back within a

week of sending the letter, he contacted Julie Thomas who informed him that her husband Kelly
Thomas would not allow her to deliver the documents to the Trustees of the Trust until he had
spoken to Plaintiffs' counsel. R. 2174
23.

Plaintiffs' counsel thereafter contacted Kelly Thomas who demanded "a

substantial piece of the action" if he was going to have the documents signed. R.2174
24.

Plaintiffs counsel, with the consent of his clients, declined. R. 2174

25.

During the first part of July, 1996, Plaintiffs' counsel was contacted by Scott

Collard, a Trustee of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust. R.2175
26.

Mr. Collard agreed to sign the Stipulation and Amended Judgement. R.2175

27.

The documents were sent to Mr. Collard, but never returned to Plaintiffs' counsel.

28.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel received notification that Mr. McDonald

R.2175

was appearing on behalf of the Trust and Trustees in the Fourth District Court action. R.2175
29.

On July 26, 1996, the Stipulation and Amended Judgement were again forwarded

to Mr. McDonald at his request. R.2175
8

30.

The documents were never executed as promised. R.2175

31.

On or about August 25, 1997 a motion to intervene in this action was filed by

John D. Wagner, Lincoln Service Corporation. Mountain West Title Company filed a motion
to intervene on or about September 7, 1997.
32.

John D. Wagner is an individual who purchased the real property at issue after

the lis pendens was filed and before judgment was entered. Lincoln Service Corporation was
the mortgage corporation which lent the money to John D. Wagner for the purchase. R.2397
33.

Mountain West Title Company was the title company who insured the title at the

time the property was purchased by John D. Wagner. R. 1803
34.

By way of a memorandum decision dated October 31,1997 the motions to

intervene were denied. R. 1885
35.

Subsequently the proposed intervenors filed a motion to reconsider with the trial

court and also filed notices of appeal of the trial court's decision with the Utah Supreme Court.
R.
36.

On March 12, 1998 the trial court entered an order where it granted the proposed

intervenors' motion to reconsider and allowed their intervention in this action. R.1892, 2107, R.
237, R.2144
37.

Subsequently the appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on the basis of

mootness.
38.

The court provided for an additional round of briefing on the issues being raised

by the intervenors.
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39.

After the additional round of briefing, oral argument was held and subsequently

on December 17, 1998 a minute entry denying the Plaintiffs' original motion to amend and/or
correct judgment was entered. R.2520
40.

That final order denying that motion was first entered on January 29, 1999 and

reentered again on February 2, 1999. R.2524, R.2542
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The two principal issues before this court are under what circumstances a settlement
agreement between parties should be enforced, and what effect does the filing of a lis pendens
have on subsequent purchases of real property. Intertwined with these two main issues is the
issue of when additional third parties should be allowed to intervene in an action and what
arguments those parties are entitled to raise as defenses.
Plaintiffs believe that Utah law clearly precluded the intervention of the intervenors in
this action. Under Utah law in order to intervene a party must meet four criterion. Those
criterion are: 1) that the application is timely, 2) the applicant has an interest in the subject
matter in dispute, 3) that the interest is or may be inadequately represented, and 4) that the
applicant is or may be bound by the judgment in the action. Lima v. Chambers. 657 P.2d 279,
282 (Utah 1982). The intervenors in this case failed on the very first criterion. Their motion to
intervene was not timely. Intervention is generally not allowed after judgment is entered. See
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 872 P.2d 482, 501 (Utah 1994).
In the present case not only did the intervenors not attempt to intervene during the
initial court proceedings but they did not seek to intervene until nearly a year had passed from
the time that this motion, which they sought to intervene, had been filed. In light of the long
10

delay in seeking to intervene the court's initial ruling refusing to allow the intervention was a
proper decision and the subsequent decision to allow the intervention of the three intervenors
was a clear abuse of discretion.
Even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the intervenors to
participate in this litigation it clearly made a legal error in allowing them to raise and plead all
of the defenses that they set forth in their objections to the Plaintiffs motions. As an
intervener, a party can raise any defenses which belong to them. An intervenor does not have
carte blanche to raise any and all defenses. In Aldrich. Nielsen. Weight. & Esplin v. The
Department of Employment Security. 878 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1994) Shelledv v. Lore. 836 P.2d
786(Utah 1992) and Kemmerer Cole Company v. Brigham Young University. 723 F.2d 54
(10th Circuit 1983) both the state courts and federal courts, interpreting Utah law, recognized
that while a party may have a right to intervene they do not have a right to bring certain
arguments. The Shelledy case is directly on point. In Shelledy the plaintiff sought title to real
property based on their purchase from the Small Business Administration. In order to quite
their title to the property the plaintiff sought to use a governmental immunity defense available
to the Small Business Administration but not available to them personally.
The Utah Supreme Court clearly stated, "The general rule is the litigant must assert his
own legal rights and interest and cannot rest his claim for relief on the legal rights or interests
of third parties." Shelledy at 789.
In their objections the intervenors raised a number of defenses which belonged solely to
the original defendants in this action and which were not raised by them, including lack of
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service necessary to effectuate in personam jurisdiction. The trial courts allowing the
intervenors to raise these defenses is plain error.
The third issue before this court is whether the settlement agreement between the
Plaintiff and Defendants should have been enforced. Utah has long recognized the
enforceability of settlement agreements. In fact, the basic rule "favors the settlement of
disputes. Such agreements under the proper circumstances may be summarily enforced."
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems. Inc.. 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1993). In Zions First
National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc..781 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989) this court held
that a settlement agreement will be enforced if the court finds it to be a binding settlement. See
also Sackler v. Savin. 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). The Plaintiffs claim that there was a
settlement agreement reached wherein the Defendants agreed to modify the form of the
judgment to effectuate the transfer of the Defendants' interest in the real property in Utah
County has never been disputed. The only evidence relating to that is the affidavit of Plaintiff s
counsel which is a matter of record. Where there is no dispute as to the agreement between
Plaintiffs and the Defendants that agreement should be enforced by the Courts and the amended
judgment entered.
The final issue before the court is the impact of the filing of a lis pendens. In Timm v.
Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The recording of a lis pendens provides constructive notice to all persons that their
rights and interest in the property at issue are controverted. One who purchases
property subject to a lis pendens only acquires the grantors interest therein as
determined by the outcome of the litigation.
Timm at 1392.

12

The Intervenors argue and the trial court agreed with them that the lis pendens itself did
not give notice of the claimed contravention or defect in title but that it gave notice only of the
pleadings on file. The court then went on to make the stretch as argued by the Intervenors that
because the real property at issue was not specifically listed in the amended complaint that in
some fashion the lis pendens was not effective. The trial court's ruling is in direct contradiction
to the Supreme Court's ruling in Timm v. Dewsnup. It also stands the entire purpose of a lis
pendens directly on its head. It also ignores the fact that in this particular action a claim for
constructive trust was plead in the amended complaint wherein Plaintiffs asked the court to
extend a constructive trust over all of the corporations property. It is undisputed that the gold
coins belonging to the Corporation were converted into the real property at issue in this appeal.
Consequently even if the trial court properly ignored the Timm v. Dewsnup ruling Plaintiffs
met their duty and burden and the lis pendens was effective as against the intervenors.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
GRANTED.
Wagner, Lincoln, and Mountain West (hereafter collectively "Intervenors") sought to

intervene in this case based on Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition to the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
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The parties here agree that there are four criterion that must be met before a party may be
allowed to intervene. The four requirements for intervention as a matter of right are: 1) that the
application is timely 2) the applicant has an interest in the subject matter in the dispute 3) that the
interest is or may be inadequately represented 4) that the applicant is or may be bound by a
judgement in the action. Lima v. Chambers. 657 p.2d 279. 282 (Utah 1982). Wagner does not
meet the required criterion.
A.

Wagner's Petition Is Not Timely.
Wagner initially asserted that his petition was timely because " . . . the court entered a

minute entry reserving the ruling on the motion to amend the judgement until all parties were
before the court. At the present time, all parties are not before the c o u r t . . . " That simply is not
true. Defendant Biesinger's counsel, David Aagard, never withdrew, only Mr. McDonald. In
speaking with Mr. Aagard, he indicated that since the motion sought did not impact his client in
any fashion he would not file any pleadings in this matter. Defendant Biesinger is, however,
represented. Furthermore, all of the remaining defendants were represented by Robert M.
McDonald.
It is possible that Wagner's claim that all parties were not represented is coupled with his
error as set forth on Page 7 of his memorandum which states, "The judgements did not create a
lien upon the trustee's property because the trustees were not named parties to the law suit and
were not the judgement debtors under the judgement." [Wagner Memo Page 7.] R.1724 In fact,
Scott W. Collard and Christine Lewis were named as defendants as trustees of the Julie C.
Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust, and did answer and were represented by Mr. Robert M.
McDonald. R. 1015
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Wagner next stated that his motion was timely because he saw no reason to intervene in
this matter until the motion to amend was filed. However by subsequent affidavit he admitted he
did not even know of the litigation. R.2384
Wagner also asserted that the Third Amended Complaint sought only a money
judgement. This is not true. The complaint specifically asked the trial court to establish a
constructive trust over the stolen property. R.975-276 Furthermore, whether the Complaint only
asked for a money judgment is irrelevant. The motion before the trial court dealt specifically with
an agreement entered into between the defendants and the plaintiff. That stipulation was entered
into to resolve this litigation. Wagner was not a party to the law suit at the time the stipulation
was entered into, did not participate in the negotiations, and had no knowledge or other relevant
information to bring to the courts attention with relationship to that agreement. Wagner's motion
was simply an attempt to change the result of the ligation post judgement. The parties settlement
agreement effectively amended the pleadings.
Intervention is generally not allowed after judgement is entered. In Envirotech Corp. v.
Callahan. 872 P.2d 482, 501 (Utah 1994) this Court stated:
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may intervene under
proper circumstances. However, the rule contemplates timely intervention at the trial
court and not for the first time on appeal. Under the rule, post judgement intervention
even in the trial court is generally not permitted.
In Jenner v. Real Estate Services. 65a P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983) the Court closely examined
the issue of when an intervention should be allowed post judgement. The court stated:
Rule 24(a), Utah R Civ P, permits intervention as a matter of right when the applicant
will be adversely affected by the courts disposition of property. However, the right is not
absolute. The rule requires that the application be made timely. Use of the words "timely"
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in the rule requires that the timeliness of the application be determined under the facts
and circumstances and in the sound discretion of the court.
Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgement.
The courts are reluctant to make exceptions to the general rule and do so only upon a
strong showing of entitlement and justification, or such unusual and compelling
circumstances as will justify their failure to seek intervention earlier.
Jenner at 1073, 1074.
Intervenors have failed to set forth any such reasons. Indeed, the Interveners' only excuse
seems to be that they felt that the suit as originally filed would not impact them. This argument is
disingenuous. First of all, this presupposes that Wagner having seen the lis pendens on the
property decided to go ahead and purchase the same anyway after making a detailed evaluation
of the merits of the forthcoming law suit and having being able to predict the outcome of the
form of judgement that was to be signed some three years later.
That simply is not what happened in this case. By affidavit Wagner stated he did not
know of the lis pendens until he was served a summons, and complaint in the Fourth District
Court case. R.23 84
Although as a matter of law, Wagner had notice that the property was subject to the lis
pendens, he lacked actual knowledge due to his failure to search the property himself and the
failure of his agents to adequately search the property for him.
The simple belief that the judgement might in some fashion not affect him is not an
acceptable excuse.
Wagner also admits the briefing on the motion before the trial court was complete nearly
a year before he sought to intervene. In Republic Insurance Group v. Domen. 774 P.2d 130 (Utah
1989) The Utah Supreme Court found a motion to intervene untimely where:
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Defendant knew this action was pending prior to his attempt to intervene.... His motion
was not filed until every fact necessary for ruling on the motion for summary judgement
had been deemed admitted and a ruling had been requested on the motion. Given these
facts and circumstances, i.e., Duke's apparent notice and opportunity to intervene at an
early stage of the proceeding and the ripeness of the case for summary judgement at the
time the Motion to Intervene was made, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.
Republic Insurance Group at 1131.
As a matter of law all the Intervenors had knowledge of the pending litigation. The
Intervenors' motion were therefore untimely and should have been denied.
B.

The Intervenors' Motion to Intervene Should Have Been Denied on the Basis That
Intervenors' Interest in the Litigation. If Such Existed. Was Adequately
Represented.
Intervenors come into this action with unclean hands by virtue of Wagner being the

purchaser of a property subject to a lis pendens. In Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 3181 (Utah
1996) The Utah Supreme Court stated:
The recording of a lis pendens provides constructive notice to all persons that the rights
and interests in the property at issue are controverted. One who purchases property
subject to a lis pendens acquires only the grantors interest therein as determined by the
outcome of the litigation.
Iimmatl392.
Acquiring a piece of property on which a lis pendens is filed subjects the party
purchasing the property to the outcome of the litigation. It does not give that party the right to
intervene in the litigation. The Timm case presents a perfect example of why this court should
deny the motion to intervene. In Timm, the trial court entered an order vacating the lis pendens
by the defendant and further entered an order of summary judgement against them. The order
was entered in approximately April of 1981.
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In January of 1991, ten years later, defendants moved for reconsideration of the summary
judgement and likewise moved for permission to file an amended counterclaim. These motions
were denied by the trial court. In 1996, some 15 years after the trial court had original entered its
order vacating the lis pendens, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the
lis pendens. Timm at 1393.
The Supreme Court held that all parties who had taken an interest in the property after the
lis pendens had been filed, but prior to the trial courts wrongful termination were still subject to
the lis pendens. It went on to hold that even parties who had purchased the property after the lis
pendens was released would be subject to it if the purchaser had actual knowledge of the
litigation. Timm at 1393. Wagner and Lincoln fit under the first category. They took whatever
interest they claimed to have in the property after the lis pendens was filed and before the
judgement was filed.
It would appear therefore that Intervenors had no right to intervene as his interests were
completely subordinate to whatever the result of the litigation was and that if he did have such a
right to intervene, That right should have been exercised prior to the time the judgement was
entered.
C.

The Trial Court's Reasons for Allowing Intervention Were Wrong as a Matter of

Law,
The trial court and the Intervenors cited a number of cases dealing with a party's right
to intervene in litigation where a party feared their rights would not be fully protected by the
litigants already participating in the litigation. Intervenors position in this case, however,
differs substantially from those types of cases, because here the Intervenors position was
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created solely by their "buying into a lawsuit." This was done through acquisition of the
property that was already subject to a lis pendens giving notice to all the world that the
ownership of the property is in dispute.
The entire crux of the trial court's decision to reverse its previous ruling denying
intervention is found in paragraph 2 of the Order Pursuant to Applicants for Intervention,
Wagner and Lincoln's Services Motion to Reconsider. The court states:
. . . the Court concludes the sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is to give
constructive notice of the pendency of the proceedings; that the only foundation for the
lis pendens in this case is the underlying action; that the lis pendens has no existence
independent of the underlying action; and that the lis pendens is only constructive
notice of those facts apparent on the face of the pleadings. Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d
190. In this case the Third Amended Complaint seeks a money judgment and makes no
claim at title, ownership, or possession of the real property subject to the lis pendens.
The lis pendens is therefore not effective to impart constructive notice of Plaintiffs'
claim to title, ownership or possession of the real property in question.
R.2333 to 2334.
The trial court's narrow reading of the purpose of the lis pendens is contrary to Utah
law. In Projects Unlimited. Inc. v. Copper State Thrift and Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah
1990) the Utah Supreme Court stated ". . . Timely recordation of the lis pendens imparts
constructive notice to all persons concerned with the property of the action to enforce the lien
regardless of whether they were named as parties or had actual knowledge of the action."
According to the plain language of the Project Unlimited decision it is the lis pendens
itself that gives the constructive notice not the pleadings on file with the court.
This argument was farther conclusively decided by the Utah Supreme Court in Timm
v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381 (1996). The argument made by Intervenors here, and agreed with
by the trial court is the very argument rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Timm.
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In Timm it states:
The lenders argue on appeal that the trust deed property was not the subject of the
litigation and therefore the trial court correctly released the lis pendens on the property.
Ms. Dewsnup argues that the trust deed property is affected by the outcome of this
litigation and therefore the lis pendens should not have been released.
As we have previously discussed Ms. Dewsnup's proposed admitted counterclaim
against the lenders involves the determination of whether the Dewsnups had paid all the
amounts due under the promissory notes. If the trial court finds on remand that they
had paid the amounts owed on the promissory notes in full, then the lenders foreclosure
on the Dewsnup's property including the trust deed property would be in error. Thus
Ms. Dewsnup's interest in the trust deed property is subject to the outcome of this case.
We therefore hold that the trial court erred in releasing the lis pendens from the trust
deed property.
Timm at 1393.
The Utah Supreme Court has conclusively stated that it is not what was in the initial
pleadings nor is it an issue of whether the real property itself is listed in the pleadings that is
determinative of whether the lis pendens is valid. The issues to be considered are whether the
property is subject to the outcome of the litigation and whether the lis pendens was filed.
Clearly in this case the property was subject to the outcome of the litigation and the basis for
the trial court's reconsideration of the prior motion to intervene was flawed as a matter of law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED INTERVENORS TO RAISE
CERTAIN ARGUMENTS.
Taken in conjunction the two sets of intervenors made the following arguments in

opposition to the Motion to Amend and/or Correct Judgment.
1.

Wagner is a bonafide purchaser and Lincoln Service is a bonafide lender.

2.

The Motion to Amend and/or Correct the Judgment is untimely under Rules 59 or
60.
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3.

Because the Motion to Amend and/or Correct was not filed within the period set
forth in Rule 59 or 60 it is barred under the doctrine of Res Judicata.

4.

The Court lacks in personam jurisdiction over the trustees of the property.

5.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the real property.

6.

The settlement agreement is barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds.2

With the exception of the bonafide purchaser/lender claim, intervenors lack standing to
raise any of these issues.
The issue of when a party has standing to raise particular arguments was addressed by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Aldridge. Nielsen. Weight and Esplin v. Department of Employment
Security. 878 P.2d 1191, (Utah App. 1994). In Aldridge the Court of Appeals stated the test as
follows:
First, an aggrieved party has standing if it can demonstrate a personal stake in the
controversy and there is some "causal relationship alleged between the injury to the
plaintiff, the governmental actions, and the relief requested." Second, If the aggrieved
party does not have standing under the first part, the court may still grant standing if there
is no other party who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the aggrieved
party and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing is denied. Finally, if the
aggrieved party has not established standing under part one or part two, a Court can none
the less grant standing if the aggrieved party raises issues of sufficient public importance.
Aldridge at 1194.
The facts in Aldridge are important in evaluating the courts decision in that case and
looking at the facts in this case. In Aldridge. Plaintiffs had represented a Mr. Karbakhsh in
proceedings before the Department of Employment Security relating to Mr. Karbakhsh's
eligibility for unemployment. The Administrative Law Judge had limited Aldridge's award of

2

There was no finding by the trial court on this issue and accordingly it is not directly
addressed in this brief.
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attorney fees to 25% of Mr. Karbakhsh's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement which
was less than the total fees submitted by Aldridge. Aldridge appealed the decision of the
department to the Utah Court of Appeals on three basis; 1) that the board was arbitrary and
capricious, 2) That the boards limitation of attorney fees denied Mr. Karbakhsh due process and
3) that the board deprived Aldridge of due process. The Court of Appeals rejected Aldridge's
ability to base its appeal on a claim that Mr. Karbakhsh had his due process denied. The Court
stated:
In the present case, Aldridge clearly has a personal stake in the outcome of the attorney
fee issue. However, insofar as Aldridge supports that position by arguing that the
Board's decision effectively denied Mr. Karbakhsh's due process, we believe that
Aldridge lacks standing. Aldridge does not have a personal stake in whether Mr.
Karbakhsh's due process were violated. Further, it is Mr. Karbakhsh who has a greater
interest in the issue of due process than Aldridge; therefore he should be the one to raise
that issue not Aldridge. Finally, the issue of Mr. Karbakhsh's due process rights is not of
such public importance that this court should grant standing to Aldridge to argue due
process issues.
Aldridge at 1194.
Like Aldridge. the interveners here seek to intervene on the basis of what they perceive as
the potential loss of property right. However, unlike in Aldridge. the only arguments raised by
the intervenors, with the exception of the bonafide purchaser argument, are those that specifically
belong to the Trustees and not to the intervenors at all. The intervenors have no right to assert a
lack of jurisdiction over Collard and Lewis, have no right to claim that the pleadings were too
vague under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the current motion was not made timely
pursuant to Rule 59 or Rule 60, or that the agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants is
not enforceable based on the Statute of Frauds.

22

In another case directly on point, Shelledv v. Lore. 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court rejected a subsequent property owner's claims of rights to defenses owned solely
by a prior property owner. In Shelledv the Plaintiff E.D. Shelledy brought an action to quiet title
to real property which he had purchased from the Small Business Administration. All of the
Defendants except the State Tax Commission and Salt Lake County claimed title to the property
under a tax deed issued by Salt Lake County in a May 1984 tax sale.
The basic facts were that in 1978 Claire and Virginia Pierson were the owners of the
subject property. They failed to pay the general property taxes for that year. As a result the
property was sold to Salt Lake County in a preliminary tax sale on January 15, 1979. In January
of 1981, two years after the preliminary sale, the Piersons conveyed their interest in the property
by quit claim deed to the Small Business Administration. Neither the Piersons nor the SBA paid
the delinquent taxes at that time. By May of 1984 the redemption period had run and the
delinquent taxes had not been paid. Consequently the county conveyed the property by tax deed
at a final May tax sale to defendant Edward Lore. Subsequently, Lore conveyed an undivided
interest to the other defendants. In December of 1988, nearly five years after the May 1984 tax
sale the SBA conveyed its interest in the property to Shelledy. Three months later Shelledy
brought an action to quite title to the property.
Shelledy's primary defense was that the SBA held sovereign immunity status which
barred the county from enforcing the tax liens or making any future assessment of tax against the
property after the SBA took control. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the SBA is a
federal agency entitled to the "full sovereign immunity of the United States." The Supreme
Court, however, rejected Shelledy's attempts to use that defense. The Court held: uThe general
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rule is that a litigant must assert his own legal rights and interest and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interest of third parties." Shelledv at 789.
The Supreme Court went on to cite with approval the holding by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Kemmerer Coal Company v. Brigham Young University. 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir.
1983) In that case an argument was made that a prior property owner had been deprived of his
property interests without due process by virtue of a tax sale issued without notice to that party.
The Tenth Circuit held:
While it may have been "repugnant to fundamental fairness . . . to deprive San Rafael of
its property without proper notice, we do not believe it fundamentally unfair to apply the
statute of limitation to Kemmerer who bought the coal in the face of record notice of a
prior claim to 'underground rights.'"
Kemmerer Coal Company at 57-58.
The Utah Supreme Court went on to state "When Shelledy purchased the property from
the SB A in 1988, he was on record notice of Defendant's rival claim to the property by virtue of
the 1984 tax deed. Therefore, we hold that Shelledy lacks standing to assert the SBA's
constitutional rights and defense." Shelledv at 790.
Like the parties in Kemmerer and Shelledv. Intervenors had constructive notice of the
rival claim to the property pursuant to the lis pendens that was filed with the Utah County
Recorders Office. Intervenors can not now go back and re-litigate issues that were waived by the
stipulation of the Trustees of the Trust nor can they substitute for the Trustees of the Trust and
raise arguments on their behalf.
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in.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.

A.

The Court Should Summarily Enforce the Settlement Agreement by Entering the
Amended Judgment.
Utah has long recognized the enforceability of settlement agreements. In fact, the basic

rule "favors the settlement of disputes. Such agreements under the proper circumstances may
be summarily enforced." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems. Inc.. 866 P.2d 581, 584
(Utah 1993) ^quoting Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 893, 942 (Utah 1987)). Settlements are
favored and even encouraged because of the obvious benefits to the parties, as well as to the
judicial system. Tracv Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah
1979.)
The Utah Supreme Court has held:
It is a basic and long established principal of contract law that agreements are
enforceable, even though there is neither a written memorialization of that agreement,
nor the signature of the parties, unless specifically required by the statute of frauds.
Murray v. State. 737 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987).
Indeed, the Court of Appeals has indicated its displeasure with litigants that back out of
oral agreements to settle cases as demonstrated by the following language:
Parties have no right to welch on a settlement deal during the sometimes substantial
period between when the deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be
garnered on a stipulation.
Brown v. Brown. 744 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J. Dissenting).
In this case, the Trustees in the Trust have attempted to "welch" on their settlement
deal, as represented by their attorney. Simply because the Defendants received what they
wanted, they should not now be entitled to renege on their portion of the Agreement.
25

Settlement agreements are favored by the Utah Supreme Court and will be enforced if
the Court finds there to be a binding settlement. Zions First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen
Interiors. Inc.. 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah App. 1989); Slacker v. Savin. 897 P.2 1217, 1220
(Utah 1995). Likewise, the trial courts decision to summarily enforce the agreement will only
be reversed if there is an abuse of discretion. Goodmansen. 866 P.2d at 584.
In this case, it is clearly established that an agreement had been reached wherein the
Defendants agreed to modify the Judgment as entered if modification was necessary to prevent
or resolve litigation necessary to enforce the Plaintiffs claims against the real property located
in Utah County. The Defendants cannot profit by seeking to back out or welch on their
Agreement made in the middle of December 1995 by delaying proceedings or refusing to sign
the Stipulation.
Plaintiffs hereby urge the Court to rule that in fact the breach between the parties
requires the Amended Judgment to be entered, and to enter such. As allowed in Goodmansen.
Plaintiffs request this Court award reasonable attorneys fees incurred in enforcing the
settlement agreement with the Defendants. See Goodmansen. 866 P.2d at 584.
B.

If the Court Elects Not to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, a Technical
Deficiency in the Present Judgment Needs to Be Corrected.
, Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "clerical mistakes in

judgments, orders or other parts of the records and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of
any party, and after such notice, if any, as the court orders . . . "
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It was the intent and purpose of the parties in entering to the Stipulation and Judgment
filed herein that Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover against certain real property formerly
owned by the Trust located in Utah County.
The property at issue belonged to the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust, the
Judgment as entered is rendered against the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust. A
Trust is'not an artificial person in the same sense that a corporation, partnership, or L.L.C. is
an artificial person. A Trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to the property is
vested in a Trustee, who has equitable duties to hold management for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Country Club Estates. 632 P.2d 869
(Utah 1981). In light of that reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a Deed to a
"Trust" is void, due to the lack of a guarantee. Sharp v. Reikhof 747 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1983).
Intervenors argue that unless the trustees are named in the judgment it is not valid.
Accordingly, if the Intervenors are correct, in order to reach the result intended by all the
parties, the Judgment must at a minimum, be amended to be entered against Scott Collard and
Christine Lewis as Trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust.
IV.

THE LIS PENDENS FILED WAS EFFECTIVE AGAINST INTERVENORS AND
ALL OTHER CLAIMANTS TO THE REAL PROPERTY AFTER THE FILING
OF THE LIS PENDENS.

A.

Wagner Was Not a Bonafide Purchaser.
The Intervenors claimed and the trial court agreed that Wagner was a bonafide

purchaser of the property in spite of the fact that he had purchased it after the filing of the lis
pendens. The Court's erroneous decision was based upon a twisted reading of certain cases
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which stated that a lis pendens gave notice of the pleadings on file. The Interveners' positions
and the Court's ruling are clear contravention of well established Utah law and precedent.
In Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) The Utah Supreme Court stated:
The recording of a lis pendens provides constructive notice to all persons that their
rights and interest in the property at issue are controverted. One who purchases
property subject to a lis pendens only acquires the grantors interest therein as
determined by the outcome of the litigation.
Timm at 1392.
Where the dispute as to the ownership of the property was a matter of public record
properly recorded with the county's recorders office prior to the purchase of the property by
Wagner, he cannot be a bonafide purchaser as a matter of law.
B.

The Prior Entry of Dismissal Did Not Terminate the Existence of the Lis Pendens.
Intervenors cited to the treatise of American Jurisprudence Second for the proposal that

the entry of an order dismissing a matter terminates the validity of the lis pendens. The trial
court appeared to adopt that position. Utah law however is clear that this is not the case. The
case of Timm v. Dewsnup is dispositive of this issue. In Timm. the trial court entered an order
vacating the lis pendens filed by the Defendant and further entered an order of summary
judgment against them. The order was entered in approximately April of 1981. In January of
1991, ten years later Defendants moved for reconsideration of summary judgment and likewise
moved for permission to file an amended counterclaim.3 That motion was denied.

3

It should be noted that the original pleadings as filed did not present the issue as to the
ownership of the property which was sought instead to be submitted by the proposed counterclaim
in 1991.
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In 1996, some fifteen years after the trial court had originally entered its order vacating
the lis pendens the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the lis pendens.
Timm at 1393.
The Supreme Court held that all parties who had taken an interest in the property after
the lis pendens had been filed, but prior to the trial court's wrongful termination were still
subject to the lis pendens. It went on to hold that even parties who had purchased the property
after the lis pendens was released would be subject to it if the purchaser had actual knowledge
of the litigation. Timm at 1393. Wagner and Lincoln fit under the first category. They took
whatever interest they claimed to have in the property after the lis pendens was filed and before
judgment was entered.
The rule of law is clearly stated in Timm. "One who purchases property subject to a lis
pendens acquires only the grantors interest therein as determined b\ the outcome of the
litigation." Timm at 1392 (emphases added). The determining factor according to the Utah
Supreme Court is not what is in the pleadings at the time that the lis pendens is filed, but what
is the result of the litigation.
C.

The Pleadings Provided Adequate Notice And/or the Stipulation of the Parties
Caused an Amendment Which Was Dispositive of this Action.
1.

The pleadings in this matter provided sufficient notice of the potential for
dispute of ownership of the property.
Intervenors and the trial court agreed that the Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the real property located in Utah County. There is clearly no legal basis for
this argument.
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The undenied facts in this case are that Kelly Thomas took the gold coins
belonging to the corporations. Those coins were converted into various items including the
property which is the subject matter of the action in Utah County. This is the very property that
was the property of the Trust at the time that the lis pendens was filed.
Intervenors seem to be trying to argue that there is some sort of relationship
between the concept of in rem jurisdiction and Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They
bootstrapped their Rule 8 argument into this proceeding by making it a jurisdictional argument.
As demonstrated in Section II. above Intervenors lacked standing to raise a Rule 8 motion at the
late date of the proceedings where the argument was made. Even if the court were to allow the
pleadings to be examined in light of Rule 8 of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure the strained reading
of the Rule by Intervenors did not support the Rule's intention. In both the second and third
claim for relief the Plaintiffs specifically identified the fact that the stolen coins, or some of them
had been sold and the proceeds converted into other types of assets and property. The real estate
at issue in this case is the proceeds of the stolen gold coins. Those facts are not disputed.
It is a long standing black letter rule of law that a thief can pass only as good a
title as he actually possesses. Heaston v. Martinez. 282 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 1955). "[W]here the
converted property has assumed altered forms by successive investments the owner may follow it
as far as he can trace it and sue at law for the substituted property, or he may hold the wrongdoer
liable for appropriate damages." May v. LeClaire, 79 US 217, 235-236 (1870). Wagner admits
that the seventh cause of action, constructive trust, relates to the stolen assets of the corporation.
As set forth by both Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court the Plaintiffs are
entitled to pursue their assets in whatever form they have been converted to. Wagner, attempts to
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argue that by pleading for constructive trust and for damages that the complaint becomes
confusing. In doing so, however, Wagner ignores the remainder of Subparagraph A of Rule 8. In
its entirety Rule 8(a) states:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleaders entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief in
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types
may be demanded. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs were entitled to plead in the alternative and in addition Plaintiffs were
entitled to pursue either damages or recover their property as they may deem appropriate. They
are not precluded from either remedy.
It appears that the only parties that are confused or at least claim to be confused
by the pleadings are the intervenors. The intervenors were not parties to this suit and have no
standing to raise this defense. The parties to the actual litigation had no problem with
understanding exactly what the issues in this case were and entered an agreement with respect
to the property in accordance with that understanding. Furthermore, the understanding of the
parties was clearly made known to Wagner and all other interested parties through the filing of
the lis pendens.
In Utah a complaint need only give fair notice to the nature and basis or grounds
of a claim and an indication of the type of litigation. It is sufficient unless a plaintiff would be
entitled to no relief under any stated facts which could be proved in support of a claim.
Blackham v. Snelgrove. 3 Utah 2d. 157, 180 P.2d 453 (1955). The pleading requirement in
Subdivision (a) of Rule 8 is to liberally construed when determining the sufficiency of a
plaintiffs complaint. Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986). Even under a stringent standard
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the complaint clearly meets the particularity requirement. When construed in light of the stated
rules of construction set forth by the Utah Supreme Court it is readily apparent that there is no
merit to the intervenors claim of a lack of in rem jurisdiction based on a vague complaint.
It was Wagner's assertion at the time that he made his motion to intervene that the
lis pendens puts all the world on notice of all of the pleadings filed in the action referenced by
the lis pendens. Those pleadings contain the lis pendens itself. The lis pendens states
unequivocally that the ownership of the property was in dispute in the litigation. Accordingly,
even if the complaint did not contain sufficient particularity to put the intervenors on notice the
lis pendens itself did so. Since all the pleadings and not merely the complaint must be
considered, the intervenors were clearly on notice as to the dispute as to the ownership of the
property and are not bonafide purchasers.
2.

Any defect in the form of the complaint was cured by the stipulation of the
parties.
Under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure it states "when issues not

raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated
in all respects as if they have been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause and to conform to the evidence and to raise issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not effect the
result of the trial of these issues . . . "
The stipulation of the parties in this Action clearly involves the recognition by the
parties that the property at issue in Utah County belongs to the Plaintiffs and was an issue that
was in dispute in the trial. The underlying purpose of Rule 15(b) is that a judgment should be

32

granted in accordance with the law and the evidence as the ends of justice require, whether the
pleadings are actually amended or not. First Security Bank v. Colonial Ford. Inc.. 597 P.2d 859
(Utah 1979). Pursuant to Rule 15 therefore, the stipulation of the parties created an amendment
of the pleadings sufficient to cure the prior lack of particularity if any such lack existed.
In Timm v. Dewsnup the Supreme Court made it clear that it is result of the
litigation that is binding on all parties that purchase a property which is then listed as being
subject to a lis pendens. In Timm v. Dewsnup, like here, the pleadings at the time that the lis
pendens was filed were originally adjudged not to state a sufficient claim for relief By way of
amendment however, the alleged defect in the pleadings is cured and it is the outcome of the
litigation and not the pleadings which is dispositive of the rights of any parties who purchase the
property.
Therefore pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the pleadings should be
deemed amended, such amendment should relate back to the filing of the original complaint, and
accordingly the lis pendens is effective, intervenors are not bonafide purchasers and title to the
property should be quieted to the Plaintiffs
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S STATED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROVIDING THE
BASIS ON WHICH IT DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS ARE ALL FLAWED.
The findings of facts and conclusions of law entered by the court and prepared by

Intervenors' counsel essentially parroted all arguments raised in Intervenors' memoranda.
Accordingly in the conclusions of law section of that document the Court accepted Intervenors'
argument that Rules 60(a) and Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bar the
amendment of the judgment in this case, that the issues were barred under the doctrine of res
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judicata, that there was no jurisdiction over the Trustees and that there was no jurisdiction over
the real property. Each of these points will be discussed briefly below, in spite of the fact that
the Intervenors have no right to bring these issues, as the issues themselves are clearly decided
improperly as a matter of law.
A.

The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction over the Persons and Property.
1.

The Court Had In Personam Jurisdiction.

The Intervenors argued and the trial court agreed that the court lacks in
personam jurisdiction over Scott Collard and Christine Lewis the Trustees of the Julie C.
Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust. The argument was based on an alleged failure to serve the
summons and complaint on Collard and Lewis personally. The allegation simply was not true.
R.1006, R.1009 The complaint clearly identifies Scott Collard and Christine Lewis as the
Trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust and both were served and both
responded in the same fashion. R.970 Indeed their answer was filed by Mr. McDonald who
filed on behalf of all the named defendants, with the exception of F. Keith Biesinger who had
his own answer filed by his own counsel, David Aagard. R.1015
By filing an answer Scott Collard and Christine Lewis as Trustees of the Trust
made their appearance in the Court. " An appearance by the defendant for any purpose except
to object to personal jurisdiction constitutes a general appearance . . . a defendant thereby
subjects himself or herself to that court's jurisdiction." Barlow v. Capital. 821 P.2d 465, 466
(Utah App. 1991). Scott Collard and Christine Lewis had made general appearance as Trustees
of the Trust and therefore any claims as to the lack of personal jurisdiction were waived.
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The court provided no explanation as to why it ignored the appearance of these
parties. It simply signed off on the document prepared by Intervenors' counsel.
2.

The Court Also Has in Rem Jurisdiction.

Intervenors seem to be making a claim that in some fashion a Third District
Court judge does not have in rem jurisdiction over property located outside of the district even
though it is still located in the State of Utah. There is nothing in the law that supports that sort
of allegation. In rem jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to determine the parties interest in
property. Carlson v. Bos..740 P.2d 1269, 1281 n.8. (Utah 1987). Utah Code Annotated § 783-4(1) provides, "The district court has original jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Clearly as a matter of law
the trial court had authority with respect to property belonging to the parties properly before it.
In addition to the other parties, the parties currently in possession and claiming interest in the
property are before the court on their own motion to intervene and their own request for
affirmative relief. The Intervenors specifically asked the trial court to rule on the validity of the
lis pendens, and accordingly all parties were property before the Court and submitted
themselves to the Court's jurisdiction.
B.

The Plaintiffs Motion Was Timely.
The Intervenors claim that the Plaintiffs motion was untimely and related that

argument to Rule 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This same argument was
made by the Thomas Defendants.
Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has no bearing on the motion that was
made before the court. The motion was not a Rule 59 motion. The basis for the motion are not
35

those set forth in that rule. The primary purpose of the motion was to enforce the settlement
agreement entered into between die parties. The alternative request, as plead in the motion,
was that the court correct, what in essence was, a clerical error under Rule 60(a) which would
modify the judgment to be against Scott Collard and Christine Lewis as trustees of the Trust
instead of the trust itself.
The objective and intention of the parties, which is undisputed, was that the property in
Utah County be surrendered to the Plaintiffs. This is not only just and equitable, where the
property really belongs to the plaintiffs as it is merely the stolen gold coins converted into
another form, but it is also clearly the correct legal result. (A thief can pass only as good a title as
he actually possesses. Heaston v. Martinez. 282 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 1955).
If the Court determines to examine the issue in light of Rule 60(a) it is readily apparent
that there is no time stricture on this particular rule. The correction contemplated under
subdivision (a) of Rule 60 must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of
the Court and the parties. Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, the
undisputed facts are that the judgment as currently stated does not reflect the intent of the parties
which was to allow the Plaintiffs to collect the property located in Utah County. The matter is
not however as significant as the intervenors would have this court believe. Contrary to the
assertion in intervenors memorandum, a trust can hold property in its own name. See U.C.A. §
75-7-401. There is no dispute here that the property at issue was trust corpus. Accordingly,
whether the judgment is against the Trust itself or against the Trustees of the Trust the effect
should be the same, this correction is merely to clarify what was intended by the parties by
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listing the Trustees individually, as they are listed on the actual deed which conveyed the
property to them in the first place.
C.

The Doctrine of Res Judicata Does Not Preclude the Enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement.
The trial court ruled that in some fashion the doctrine of res judicata acts as a bar to

Plaintiffs attempt to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. Res judicata
prevents parties or their privies from re-litigating a claim that was once litigated on the merits
and resulted in a final judgment. See Salt Lake Citv v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731
(Utah 1995). The doctrine of res judicata clearly does not apply to the facts of this case. There
had been no attempt to re-litigate an issue. There was no final litigation of any issue. There
was simply a stipulation by the parties. There was a settlement agreement. Part one of that
settlement agreement provided for the entry of one judgment. Part two of that settlement
agreement provided for the substitution of a second judgment if the parties goals could not be
met through the first stipulated judgment.
Rather than trying to re-litigate an issue this is simply an attempt to enforce an
agreement to complete the entry of judgment in this case. In essence the judgment entered was
not afinaljudgment as viewed by the parties because it was subject to being amended and
changed in order to meet the parties goals.
CONCLUSION
The trial court allowed the Intervenors to complicate the issues in this case which in
reality are simple and straight forward. The motion that was before the trial court sought
simply to enforce a settlement agreement entered into by the parties. The terms of that
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settlement agreement and its existence are not disputed. The sole defenses raised dealt with
technicalities relating to inapplicable rules of civil procedure or claims of technical deficiencies
within the pleadings themselves.
The technical deficiencies were from the failure to meet certain time frames of Rules of
Civil procedure which are irrelevant to the enforcement of the settlement agreement. Those
rules are not applicable to the primary issue that was before the court which was the
enforceability of the agreement. If the Court enforced the settlement agreement between the
parties the alternative portion of the motion, the correction under Rule 60(a) never would have
come into play. If the Court had declined to enforce the settlement agreement, Rule 60(a) was
not subject to the same time restrictions and time bars proposed by the Defendants and
Intervenors under Rule 59.
The Intervenors arguments were not even theirs to make. If any party could have made
those arguments it would have been the Trustees. They did not. Indeed, at that late date in the
proceedings they could not have made those motions. Those arguments had been waived. They
were waived not only by lapse of time but by agreement and stipulation to the settlement
agreement with respect to the form and intent of the judgment.
The property in Utah County rightfully belongs to the Plaintiffs. It was purchased with
their gold coins or the proceeds therefrom. That is not disputed. The lis pendens was a matter
of public record. Under the law the Intervenors were charged with constructive notice that they
were buying a property that could end up belonging to someone else depending on the outcome
of the litigation. That is the risk they took by purchasing the property after the lis pendens was
filed. Wagner's recourse is not now to interfere in the settlement agreement but should be to
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look to his title insurer to recover for the error that the title insurer made in failing to disclose
the lis pendens to Wagner at the time that he was entering into the purchase of this property.
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that this Court overturn all of the orders of the
trial court and order the trial court to modify the judgment as per the parties stipulation and
agreement.
Respectfully Submitted.
DATED this 13th day of September, 1999.
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER
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SHERMAN C. YOUNG (3891)
RYAN J. TAYLOR (7643)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Interveners John D. Wagner and
Lincoln Service Corporation
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

1ST WESTERN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KELLY THOMAS, etal.,

ORDER PURSUANT TO APPLICANTS
FOR INTERVENTION, WAGNER AND
LINCOLN SERVICE'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Defendants.
JOHN D. WAGNER, LINCOLN
SERVICE CORPORATION,
Applicants for Intervention as
Defendants and Cross-claimants.

Civil No. 910901831 CV
Judge: Tyrone Medley

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Applicants for Intervention,
John D. Wagner and Lincoln Financial Service Corporation's (hereinafter "Wagner and
Our File No.: 2000-96-8
960100001

Lincoln Service") Motion to Reconsider, dated November 3, 1997. Applicants Wagner and
Lincoln Service were represented by their attorney of record, Sherman C. Young. Mountain
West Title Company, also an Applicant for Intervention, was represented by Reed B. Park.
Plaintiff First Western Corporation was represented by its attorney of record, Shawn D.
Turner.
Having heard the parties' arguments, and having reviewed the memoranda in support,
in opposition, and in reply, the Court
HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1. For the reasons stated at page 1 of the transcript of the Court's ruling, a partial
copy of which is attached, the Memorandum Decision dated October 31, 1997, is not a final
order of the Court and is therefore subject to revision and reconsideration. Applicants' motion
to reconsider is therefore appropriately considered by the Court and shall not be excluded on a
procedural basis.
2. For the reasons set forth in the memorandum in support of motion to reconsider,
and the reply memoranda, the Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 31, 1997, is
hereby set aside. In so ruling, the Court relies upon Hamilton v. Smith, 808 F.2d 36 (10th
Cir. (Utah 1986)), Bush v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (D.Utah 1992), Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d
186 (Utah 1979), and Bagnell v. Suburbia Land Company, 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978). Based
upon these authorities, the Court concludes that the sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is
to give constructive notice of the pendency of the proceedings; that the only foundation for the
Our File No.: 2000-96-8
960100001
7

lis pendens in this case is the underlying action; that the lis pendens has no existence
independent of the underlying action; and that the lis pendens is only constructive notice of
those facts apparent on the face of the pleadings. Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d at 190. In this
case, the Third Amended Complaint seeks a money judgment and makes no claim to title,
ownership, or possession of the real property subject of the lis pendens. The lis pendens is
therefore not effective to impart constructive notice of Plaintiffs claim to title, ownership or
possession of the real property in question.
3. Applicants Wagner and Lincoln Service's motion dated August 20, 1997, to
intervene is timely. Mountain West Title Company's motion to intervene is also timely.
Because the lis pendens was not effective to impart constructive notice of Plaintiff s claims of
title, ownership, or possession, Wagner and Lincoln Service first learned of, and first had
notice of Plaintiff's claim to title, ownership and possession of the real property on May 27,
1997, through Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to summary judgment in the Fourth
District Court action. The motions to intervene having been filed approximately three months
after that date, the Court is of the opinion that the filing of the motions to intervene were
timely.
4. Based upon the foregoing, Wagner and Lincoln Service's motion for leave to
intervene dated August 20, 1997, is hereby granted. Mountain West Title Company's motion
to intervene is also granted.

Our File No.: 2000-96-8
960100001
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5. Plaintiff shall have until February 27, 1998, to supplement, or file a renewed
motion and/or memorandum in support of its Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment
dated October 17, 1996.
6. Intervenors Wagner, Lincoln Services and Mountain West Title Company, shall file
their memorandums in opposition to Plaintiff's motion, on or before March 16, 1998.
7. Plaintiff shall file its reply memorandum on or before March 30, 1998.
Dated: February

, 1998.
BY^flE COURT

:

N. TYRONE MEDLEY

ml^ *&
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prepaid, addressed as follows:
Shawn D. Turner
LARSON, KJRKHAM & TURNER
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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Salt Lake City, UT 84115
David T. Aagard
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Tuesday, February 17, 1998
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Case No. 910901331

Judge's Ruling
THE COURT:

I am going to rule as follows:

rirst

4

or all, I do thin* It la important to note, for what value

5

it may have, that the majority of the time when I render a

6

memorandum decision, I usually don't leave up in the air

7

the issue of whether or not it was my intention that that

8

decision be the final Order of the Court.

9

include a statement right above my signature that this is,

Ordinarily, I

10

in fact, the Order signed by the court or alternatively

11

instructing counsel to prepare such and order,

12

neither in this particular case.

13

I did

I think it is very reasonable to construe that

14

memorandum decision consequently as a decision but not

15

what I would call a final order.

16

revision and subject to reconsideration, making at least

17

the Motion to Reconsider appropriate to consider by this

18

court and not exclude it on a procedural basis.

19

Consequently, subject to

As to the underlying merits of the Motion to

20

Reconsider, let me tell you this has really been a

21

struggle.

22

decisions because that is the work of the appellate court

23

most of the time, but under the right set of circumstances

24

obviously it is appropriate.

25

I am going to set aside my Memorandum Decision,

First of all, I don't like reconsidering my

And in this particular case,

1

Mr, Turner, cor tne reasons set forth in tne Memorandum in

2

support of the Motion to Reconsider, as well as in Reply

3

and tne court is going to rely upon the authorities and

4

the analysis contained therein.

5

And by way of summary, what I am going to do is

6

find, in fact, that the lis pendens itself has no

7

independent existence.

8

constructive notice of all facts that are apparent from

9

the face of the pleadings.

That it puts parties on

That in this particular case

10

the third amended complaint, face of the pleadings, seeks

11

a money judgment.

12

affective to impart the type of notice that would require

13

the interveners to act.

14

attempt to change title or possession of this property

15

through the Motion for Summary Judgment in the Fourth

16

District Court action, and the Motion to Intervene having

17

been filed approximately 3 months after that date, this

18

court is of the opinion that the filing for the Motion to

19

Intervene is timely,

20

Therefore, the lis pendens is not

That they first learned of an

I think I have already indicated the court is

21

going to rely on, I think it is the Bush vs. Doyle and the

22

Hamilton vs. Smith cases that are set forth in the

23

interveners' memoranda, as well as the Utah Supreme Court

24

case that was just referenced by Mr. Ycung regarding the

25

effect of filing a lis pendens.
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1

I am going to order, Mr. Young, that you reduce

2

that decision to a written order and submit it to the

3

court, consistent with 4-304 sub 2 which will give

4

Mr, Turner an opportunity to object to the form of the

5

Order itself.

6

await any further movement on this case as to what the

7

next appropriate step is*

Once that is signed and entered, I will

Mr. Turner?

SHERiMAiN C. YOUNG (3891)
RYAN J. TAYLOR (7643)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Intervenors
John D. Wagner and
Lincoln Service Corporation
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

1ST WESTERN CORP., et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND AND/OR TO
CORRECT JUDGMENT

KELLY THOMAS, etal.,
Defendants.
JOHN D. WAGNER and LINCOLN
SERVICES CORPORATION,
Intervenors.
Civil No. 910901831
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

This matter came before the Court on December 14, 1998, for oral arguments on
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment, filed October 21, 1996 (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the "Motion"). Shawn D. Turner, Esq. appeared on behalf of
Plaintiffs. Sherman C. Young appeared on behalf of Intervenors, John D. Wagner and
Lincoln Services Corporation (hereinafter sometimes "Wagner" and "Lincoln"'). The Court

having heard oral arguments and having reviewed the memoranda in support of and in
opposition to the Motion, and having entered it's Minute Entry dated December 17, 1998,
hereby finds, concludes, and orders as follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action was commenced by Plaintiffs on or about March 19, 1991.

2.

In their initial complaint, Plaintiffs sought the recovery of certain personal

property which Plaintiff asserted was stolen by Defendants.
3.

During the-course of the litigation, Plaintiffs' complaint was amended three

times as defendants were added and the whereabouts of Plaintiffs' assets were revealed.
4.

Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on October 23, 1992.

5.

The Third Amended Complaint sets forth seven claims for relief. They are: 1)

conversion by Defendants Thomas, 2) receipt of stolen property, 3) concealment of stolen
property, 4) conversion by Defendant Biesinger, 5) trespass to chattels, 6) breach of fiduciary
duty, and finally, 7) constructive trust.
6.

The material allegations of the Seventh Claim for Relief are found in paragraphs

41 and 42 of the Third Amended Complaint which state as follows:
41. By virtue of the removal of First Western Corp.,
and National Fund Inc.'s property, a constructive trust
should be created over the corporate assets to prevent
Thomas' improper use of the assets.
42. The Court should determine the true ownership of
said assets and deduce that they are subject to a
constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiffs.
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7.

Nowhere in the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint is the real property

which is subject of the Motion described by legal description, address, or otherwise. The real
property subject of the Motion is hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Real Property/'
8.

The only other reference to the "corporate assets" referenced in paragraphs 41

and 42 is found at Paragraph 18 of the Third Amended Complaint which states as follows:
18. Plaintiff corporations had 2353 gold coins located
in a safe in Utah County, State of Utah.
9.

In the prayer of the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sought a money

judgment under the Seventh Claim For Relief. Paragraph G of the prayer reads as follows:
G. For judgment on Plaintiffs' seventh claim for
relief against Defendant Kelly Thomas for damages in
an amount to be proven at trial, but in any case, at
least $850,000 plus punitive damages in the sum of
$1,000,000.
10.

Nowhere in the Third Amended Complaint is there a request by Plaintiffs for a

decree imposing a constructive trust over the Real Property.
11.

On the same day that Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, October

23, 1992, Plaintiffs recorded a lis pendens (hereinafter "Lis Pendens") in the office of the
Utah County Recorder. The Lis Pendens was recorded as Entry No. 56750 in Book 3024 at
Page 251-252 and described the Real Property.
12.

Shortly thereafter and subsequent to the recording of the Lis Pendens, Christine

C. Lewis and Scott W. Collard, trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable trust, conveyed
the Real Property by warranty deed to John D. Wagner. This deed was executed on
October 30, 1992, and was recorded on November 4, 1992, as Entry No. 59565 in Book 3032
at Page 526 in the Utah County Recorder's office.
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13.

As part of Wagner's purchase of the property, Wagner was loaned $124,000.

This loan was secured by a deed of trust recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder
on the 4th day of November, 1992 as Entry No. 59566 in Book 3032 at Page 527. This trust
deed was assigned to Lincoln Services Corporation, also on November 4, 1992.
14.

Thereafter, this litigation proceeded until in 1995, when the parties entered

settlement negotiations.
15.

Shortly before trial, the parties reached a stipulated settlement.

16.

Pursuant to-the stipulation, an order was drafted which provided that all rights,

interest and title to the Real Property were to be awarded to Plaintiffs.
17.

Discussions ensued as to the form of the order with Defendants indicating a

preference for a monetary judgment. Further discussions were had as to whether a monetary
judgment would be sufficient for settlement purposes and the Plaintiffs assert that an
agreement among the panies was reached which provided that the money judgment would be
amended if necessary to satisfy the parties' intent.
18.

A monetary judgment against the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust was

entered by this Court on December 1, 1995. The entire language of the judgment states as
follows:
This matter came before the Court for entry of judgment
against Defendant Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust.
The Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that judgment is entered against the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Trust in the amount of $200,000. Said judgment
shall bear interest at the rate of 9.22% until such time as the
judgment is fully collected.
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19.

At the same time, on December 1, 1995, the Court entered an Order of

Dismissal, dismissing this litigation with prejudice.
20.

Plaintiffs' judgment has never been docketed or filed in Utah County.

21.

Approximately five months later, in May 1996, Plaintiffs commenced an action

in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, seeking title to the Real Property.
In the Fourth District action, Plaintiffs asserted that as a consequence of the recording of the
Lis Pendens, Plaintiff First Western Corporation, had ua priority position in the amount of its
judgment of $200,000" arid that the Court should enter an order quieting title to the property
in Plaintiff.
22.

Wagner and Lincoln were named as defendants in the action and filed their

answer in the Fourth District on or about July 1, 1996.
23.

On July 9, 1996, Wagner and Lincoln's counsel wrote Plaintiffs' counsel setting

forth various theories and analyses as to why Plaintiffs' claim in the Fourth District action was
not meritorious.
24.

Included in those analyses was the observation by Wagner and Lincoln that

Plaintiffs had taken judgment against the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust" in the Third
District action. Wagner and Lincoln asserted that a trust was not an artificial person in the
same sense that a corporation, a partnership, or an LLC is an artificial person, but rather is a
property interest in which the legal title to the property is vested in a trustee, who has
equitable duties to hold and manage the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries. See
Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1987). Wagner and Lincoln further asserted that the
judgment against the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust" was a judgment against a property

5

interest not capable of holding title to real property and that the judgment therefore, could not
be a lien upon real property, record title of which was in the name of the trustees.
25.

In a letter to Wagner and Lincoln's counsel dated October 21, 1996, Plaintiffs'

counsel responded that he was in the process of preparing the necessary legal responses "to
identify what I see as problems in the presentation set forth in your July 9, 1996 letter."
26.

Unknown to Wagner and Lincoln, on the same day, October 21, 1996,

Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment which is presently before the
Court.
27.

Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend and/or to Correct Judgment was apparently filed

in response to the positions taken by Wagner and Lincoln in the Fourth District action.
28.

In Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion To Amend and/or to Correct

Judgment, Plaintiffs' request that the judgment be amended to enter judgment against the
trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust.
29.

At the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion To Amend and/or to Correct Judgment,

Plaintiffs submitted a proposed Amended Judgment. The proposed Amended Judgment
however, reads as follows:
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed, that judgment is
entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Trust.
Plaintiffs are awarded as judgment, all of Defendant Julie C.
Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust's rights and interest in the
property located at the street address commonly referred to as
162 N. 1400 E., Pleasant Grove, Utah, more particularly
described as follows:
[metes and bounds legal description omitted].

6

The Court takes judicial notice of that Lis Pendens filed by
Plaintiffs with the Utah County Recorder's office, entry no.
56750 book no. 3024, page 251 and affirms that the issue of
title, ownership and control of the property identified therein
has been determined in favor of the Plaintiffs in this action.
30.

After October 23, 1997, further correspondence was had between Wagner and

Lincoln's counsel and Plaintiffs' counsel pertinent to the Fourth District action.
31.

Ultimately on May 2, 1997, Wagner and Lincoln as Defendants in the Fourth

District action filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asserting three theories; 1) that
Plaintiffs had no lien on the Utah County property because no judgment had been docketed in
Utah County, 2) that Plaintiffs' Lis Pendens did not afford its judgment of priority over
Wagner and Lincoln's interest because Plaintiffs' interest was a money judgment, and 3) that
Plaintiffs' judgment against the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable trust was a judgment against a
property interest not capable of holding title to real property and was not a lien upon real
property, record title of which was in the trustees of the trust.
32.

In response to Wagner and Lincoln's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition on May 27, 1996, as well as a motion to stay
dispositive proceedings in the Fourth District action, pending the resolution of the Motion To
Amend and/or to Correct Judgment then pending before this Court.
33.

It was at this time, May 27, 1996, that Wagner and Lincoln first learned of

Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend and/or to Correct Judgment which had been filed by Plaintiffs
eight months prior.
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34.

After learning of the Motion, on August 20, 1997, Wagner and Lincoln filed

their Motion To Intervene in this action in the Third District for the purpose of opposing
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or Correct Judgment.
35.

Wagner's and Lincoln's motion was briefed and oral arguments were heard on

the Motion to Intervene on September 29, 1997.
36.

On October 31, 1997, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision denying

Wagner's and Lincoln's Motion To Intervene.
37.

On November 3, 1997, Wagner and Lincoln filed a Motion To Reconsider the

Court's October 31, 1997, decision. That motion was also briefed, and oral arguments on
Wagner and Lincoln's Motion to Reconsider were heard February 17, 1998.
38.

In ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, the Court set aside the October 31,

1997, Memorandum Decision and granted Wagner and Lincoln Services leave to intervene.
39.

Thereafter, further briefing on the Motion to Amend and/or to Correct

Judgment was submitted to the Court by Plaintiffs and Intervenors.
40.

In addition to the memoranda filed by Intervenors, Intervenors filed the

Affidavit of Intervenor John D. Wagner and the Affidavit of John Martin AJdrige, the
President of First Colony Mortgage Corporation, the mortgage banker which originated
Lincoln Services' loan.
41.

The Affidavit of John D. Wagner states that on or about November 4, 1992,

Mr. Wagner paid for and purchased the real property subject of this lawsuit for a purchase
price of $122,500, that the purchase price was borrowed from First Colony Mortgage, and
that the loan was assigned from First Colony Mortgage to Lincoln Services Corporation.
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42.

The Affidavit further states that at the time Mr. Wagner purchased the property

he was not aware of any claim asserted against the property by First Western Corporation or
National Fund, Inc. More particularly, paragraph 10 of Mr. Wagner's Affidavit states as
follows:
10. No person, including the trustees of the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Family Trust, or any person at First Colony
Mortgage or any other person, represented, or told me that
First Western Corporation or National Fund, Inc., claimed an
interest in the property. I did not see any document of any
nature whatsoever, which indicated that First Western
Corporation or National Fund, Inc., claimed an interest in the
property. At the time I purchased the property I had never
heard of, and was not aware that a corporation named First
Western Corporation, or a corporation named National Fund,
Inc., even existed.
11. I first learned of First Western's claim to my property in
June 1996, when I was served with a summons and
complaint in the Fourth District Court action. Prior to that
time I had no knowledge of any claim against the property by
any person.
43.

The Affidavit of John Martin Aldridge in pertinent part states:
From November 4, 1992 [the date of closing] until March 12,
1998 [the approximate date Mr. Aldridge signed his
Affidavit], I had no knowledge of any entity known by the
name of First Western Corporation nor of any entity known
by the name of National Fund, Inc. Before March 12, 1998,
I had no knowledge that First Western Corporation or
National Fund, Inc. asserted a claim against this property.

44.

Oral arguments on Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or Correct Judgment were

heard by the Court on December 14, 1998. At the conclusion or oral arguments, the Court
took the matter under advisement. Subsequently, the Court issued its Minute Entry dated
December 17, 1998.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- Bona Fide Purchaser Analysis/Iis Pendens Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and after consideration of the memoranda
in support and in opposition, the authorities, and analyses therein, as well as at oral argument,
the Court hereby concludes as follows:
45.

In this case Wagner took title to the real property in question by way of a

warranty deed recorded on November 4, 1992. Lincoln Services' deed of trust was also
recorded on November 4,1992. The Court concludes that even though Plaintiffs' Lis Pendens
was recorded approximately two weeks earlier, on October 23, 1992, Intervenors did not have
constructive notice of Plaintiffs' claims to the Real Property. Based upon the Affidavits of
John D. Wagner and John Martin Aldridge, the Court further concludes that Intervenors had
no actual notice or knowledge of Plaintiffs' claims to the real property.
46.

The Court concludes that in seeking only a money judgment, and due to the

absence in the Third Amended Complaint of any reference to, or description of, the Real
Property, the recording of the Lis Pendens is ineffective to give notice of Plaintiffs' claims to
the Real Property.
47.

The Court concludes consistent with its order of March 12, 1998, that the sole

purpose of recording a Lis Pendens is to give constructive notice of the pendency of the
proceeding; that the only foundation for the Lis Pendens is the underlying action; that the Lis
Pendens has no existence independent of the underlying action; and that the Lis Pendens is
only constructive notice of those facts apparent on the face of the pleadings. Hansen v.
Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). In this case the Third Amended Complaint seeks a
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money judgment and makes no claim to title, ownership, or possession of the real property
subject of the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens is therefore not effective to impart constructive
notice of Plaintiffs' claim to title, ownership, or possession of the real property in question.
48.

Consistent with Bush v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (D. Utah 1992), and Hamilton v.

Smith, 808 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1986), the Court concludes that the Third Amended Complaint
seeks monetary damages only. Utah law does not allow for the filing of a Lis Pendens in
cases seeking a money judgment.
49.

Accordingly, because Intervenors took their respective interests in the real

property without notice, or knowledge of, Plaintiffs' claims and because Intervenors gave
value, Intervenors satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of bona fide purchaser. The Utah
Supreme Court has defined a bona fide purchaser in the case of Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d
1188 (Utah 1993), wherein the Court stated M[a] bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable
consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse
claim of another's outstanding rights to the seller's title." Id. at 1197. In Baldwin the Court
noted that if the purchaser is bona fide, the purchaser's interest in the property cannot be
affected, even if the grantor took title to the property through a fraudulent conveyance. Id/,
See also 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 308 (1996).
50.

Further, even if Lincoln Services cannot be construed as a "purchaser,"

Lincoln's interest in the real estate as a mortgagee is protected as a result of the uShelter
Rule." The Shelter Rule provides that transferees from bona fide purchasers are protected by
their transferor's bona fides. 11 Am. Jur. Vendors and Purchasers § 509 (1997); 92 C.J.S.
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Vendors and Purchasers § 360 (1955 as updated 1997); Sun Valley Land and Minerals v. Bur,
853 P.2d 607 (Idaho App. 1993).
51.

The bona fides of Intervenors preclude the Court from granting the requested

relief as against the interests of Intervenors.
- Standing 52.

Based upon their bona fides, Intervenors have standing to assert the defenses

raised in their memoranda in opposition to the Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court has established three standards for determining whether a litigant has
standing. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). In this
case, Intervenors satisfy two of the three alternative standards of Terracor. First, as owner
and mortgagee of the real property in question, Intervenors have a personal stake in the
outcome of the dispute. Should the requested relief be granted, Intervenors would be divested
of their interests in the property in question. Second, because the Defendants in this action
conveyed the real property to Intervenors on November 4, 1992, Defendants have divested
themselves of any interest in the realty, and no other party has a greater stake in the outcome
of the issues. As consequence, it is unlikely that these issues will be raised by the Defendants.
Cf Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988) (holding that a
party lacked standing because the party had previously quit claimed her interest); Wade v.
Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990) (holding a defendant did not have standing because he
held no interest in the subject real property).
53.

Further, this matter involves title to real property and Intervenors are seeking to

protect their interest in such property. In this regard, Doyle vs. West Temple Terrace
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Company, 135 P. 103, 105 (Utah 1913), is instructive. Doyle holds that a party seeking to
protect an interest in real estate "may assail a judgment, deed or any other instrument affecting
his title, for the reason that such judgment or instruments are void, upon the ground of fraud
or for any other legal reason." Accordingly, Intervenors have standing to challenge the
proposed amended judgment and to assert the theories addressed below.
54.

The cases relied upon by Plaintiff on the question of standing are not

persuasive. Unlike the attorneys \n~Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v DES, 878 P.2d 1191
(Utah 1994), in this case, Interveners are the only parties with an interest in the property.
And, as evidenced by the Defendants' lack of participation in these proceedings, there is no
other party in a better position to raise the issues and no party has a greater interest in the
outcome than Intervenors. In Aldrich, the Court held that the former client had the greater
interest in the issue presented and should have raised the issue, rather than his attorneys. Id.
at 1194.
55.

Neither is Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), helpful to Plaintiffs1

position. This is because in Shelledy, unlike this case, the Court held that the plaintiff did not
have standing to assert a governmental immunity defense because the plaintiff was on "record
notice" of defendant's sheriff deed at the time the plaintiff took title. Id. at 790. This Court
has previously determined that Intervenors did not have notice of Plaintiffs' claims to the real
property. Therefore, Shelledy is distinguished from the present case.
56.

Accordingly, Intervenors have standing to assert the defenses set forth below.
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- Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 57.

Plaintiffs' motion is not appropriate under Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P. Rule 60(a) is

intended to correct clerical mistakes in judgments. A clerical mistake is "a type of mistake or
omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which does not invoke a
legal decision or judgment by an attorney." Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co.,
669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) (citing In re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 F. Supp.
605, 607 (1967)). Whether to pursue a money judgment or a decree quieting title is a
substantive legal decision to which Rule 60(a) does not apply. See E.G. Britt v. Whitmire, 956
F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding rule governing clerical mistakes does not apply to a motion
seeking correction of substantive judgment or error that affects the substantive rights of the
parties).
58.

Rule 60(a) therefore does not provide a basis for Plaintiffs' motion because

Plaintiffs seek, 1) to change a money judgment to an order establishing title in Plaintiffs or in
the alternative, 2) to name as judgment debtors the trustees, over whom the Court does not
have jurisdiction (see below). The requested relief would be a substantive modification of the
judgment which is inappropriate under Rule 60(a). State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah
App. 1991); Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143 ( Utah 1970).
- Rule 59(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59.

Neither is relief under Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

appropriate. It is clear that Plaintiffs seek to amend the judgment by naming non-parties as
judgment debtors, or in the alternative, to change the money judgment to an order decreeing
the rights of parties in real property. A motion to alter or amend judgment shall be served no
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later than ten (10) days after entry of the judgment. U.R.C.P. 59(e). Plaintiffs' motion was
served eleven months after the entry of judgment and therefore is not timely under Rule 59(e).
- Rule 60(b)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60.

Entering into an ill-advised stipulation without fully understanding its

consequences is "correctly characterized as mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect under
Rule 60(b)(1)." Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 386 (Utah App.
1991). Accordingly, a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
would be an appropriate basis for Plaintiffs' motion. However, a motion under Rule 60(b)(1)
must be made within three months of the entry of the judgment. Plaintiffs' motion was filed
eleven months after the entry of judgment and is therefore not timely under Rule 60(b)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
- Res Judicata 61.

On December 1, 1995, the Court entered a final judgment in response to

Plaintiffs' claims. At the same time, the Court entered an order of dismissal, and the time for
appeal has run. The doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes Plaintiffs from re-litigating
the same claims in an attempt to re-fashion the remedy sought. See Richards v. Siddoway, 471
P.2d 143, 147 (Utah 1976) (despite attempt to claim a clerical error in a judgment, there was
no clerical error and because the time had run for bringing motion to amend the judgment, the
judgment was res judicata); see also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731
(Utah I995)(res judicata or claim preclusion prevents parties or their privies from relitigating
a claim that was once litigated on the merits and resulted in a final judgment). Not only does
the doctrine of res judicata preclude relitigation of claims previously litigated, but it also
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^«c-x*:

precludes the litigation of claims that could have been litigated in the prior action, but were
not. Office of Recovery Sen/ices v. V.G.P, 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). Res
judicata applies to consent judgments and court approved settlements such as this case. Id.
Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the granting of Plaintiffs' motion.
- Jurisdiction over the Trustees 62.

A review of the file in this matter reveals that Scott W. Collard and Christine

C. Lewis were never served in their capacities as trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable
Trust. The file reveals that these persons were only served in their individual capacity.
Neither have the trustees entered a general appearance through a filing, motion, or a pleading.
Until service of process is accomplished a court does not have jurisdiction to proceed to a
judgment even though a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 62(b) Am. Jur. 2d
Process § 4 (1990). Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute
is deemed necessary, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the commencement
of the action which confers jurisdiction. Murdoch v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971); see
also Garcia v. Garcia, 111 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (holding the requirements of Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to service of process, are jurisdictional). The Court
therefore lacks personal jurisdiction over the trustees and is precluded from entering a
judgment against them.
- Jurisdiction Over The Real Property 63.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the Utah County property. It is an established

rule that in order to confer jurisdiction upon a court to render a judgment, the subject matter
must be presented for the court's consideration in some mode sanctioned by law. 61(a) Am.
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Jur. 2d Pleadings § 2 (1981). It is through proper pleadings that the jurisdiction of the court
in a particular case is conferred. A party may not be granted relief in the absence of pleadings
to support the relief requested and a judgment based upon an issue not pleaded is a nullity. 46
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 2 (1994).
64.

The Third Amended Complaint makes no allegation as to the real property at

issue. The prayer in the Seventh Claim for Relief requests a money judgment.
Notwithstanding the changes that have been introduced by modern systems of pleadings, it still
remains the duty of the Plaintiffs to state their claim in their complaint. 61(a) Am. Jur.
Pleadings § 71 (1981). In the absence of such pleading, the court lacks jurisdiction over the
real property in question. In the absence of such jurisdiction, the requested relief cannot be
granted.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment dated October 21, 1996 is
hereby denied.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

1ST WESTERN CORP., et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND AND/OR TO
CORRECT JUDGMENT

KELLY THOMAS, etal.,
Defendants.
JOHN D. WAGNER and LINCOLN
SERVICES CORPORATION,
Intervenors.
Civil No. 910901831
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

This matter came before the Court on December 14, 1998, for oral arguments on
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment, filed October 21, 1996 (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the "Motion"). Shawn D. Turner, Esq. appeared on behalf of
Plaintiffs. Sherman C. Young appeared on behalf of Intervenors. John D. Wagner and
Lincoln Services Corporation (hereinafter sometimes '"Wagner" and "Lincoln"). The Court

having heard oral arguments and having reviewed the memoranda in support of and in
opposition to the Motion, and having entered it's Minute Entry dated December 17, 1998,
hereby finds, concludes, and orders as follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action was commenced by Plaintiffs on or about March 19, 1991.

2.

In their initial complaint, Plaintiffs sought the recovery of certain personal

property which Plaintiff asserted was stolen by Defendants.
3.

During the course of the litigation, Plaintiffs' complaint was amended three

times as defendants were added and the whereabouts of Plaintiffs' assets were revealed.
4.

Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on October 23, 1992.

5.

The Third Amended Complaint sets forth seven claims for relief. They are: 1)

conversion by Defendants Thomas, 2) receipt of stolen property, 3) concealment of stolen
property, 4) conversion by Defendant Biesinger, 5) trespass to chattels, 6) breach of fiduciary
duty, and finally, 7) constructive trust.
6.

The material allegations of the Seventh Claim for Relief are found in paragraphs

41 and 42 of the Third Amended Complaint which state as follows:
41. By virtue of the removal of First Western Corp.,
and National Fund Inc.'s property, a constructive trust
should be created over the corporate assets to prevent
Thomas' improper use of the assets.
42. The Court should determine the true ownership of
said assets and deduce that they are subject to a
constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiffs.
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7.

Nowhere in the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint is the real property

which is subject of the Motion described by legal description, address, or otherwise. The real
property subject of the Motion is hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Real Property/'
8.

The only other reference to the "corporate assets" referenced in paragraphs 41

and 42 is found at Paragraph 18 of the Third Amended Complaint which states as follows:
18. Plaintiff corporations had 2353 gold coins located
in a safe in Utah County, State of Utah.
9.

In the prayer of the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sought a money

judgment under the Seventh Claim For Relief. Paragraph G of the prayer reads as follows:
G. For judgment on Plaintiffs' seventh claim for
relief against Defendant Kelly Thomas for damages in
an amount to be proven at trial, but in any case, at
least $850,000 plus punitive damages in the sum of
$1,000,000.
10.

Nowhere in the Third Amended Complaint is there a request by Plaintiffs for a

decree imposing a constructive trust over the Real Property.
11.

On the same day that Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, October

23, 1992, Plaintiffs recorded a lis pendens (hereinafter "Lis Pendens") in the office of the
Utah County Recorder. The Lis Pendens was recorded as Entry No. 56750 in Book 3024 at
Page 251-252 and described the Real Property.
12.

Shortly thereafter and subsequent to the recording of the Lis Pendens, Christine

C. Lewis and Scott W. Collard, trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable trust, conveyed
the Real Property by warranty deed to John D. Wagner. This deed was executed on
October 30, 1992, and was recorded on November 4, 1992, as Entry No. 59565 in Book 3032
at Page 526 in the Utah County Recorder's office.
">
j

13.

As part of Wagner's purchase of the property, Wagner was loaned $124,000.

This loan was secured by a deed of trust recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder
on the 4th day of November, 1992 as Entry No. 59566 in Book 3032 at Page 527. This trust
deed was assigned to Lincoln Services Corporation, also on November 4, 1992.
14.

Thereafter, this litigation proceeded until in 1995, when the parties entered

settlement negotiations.
15.

Shortly before trial, the parties reached a stipulated settlement.

16.

Pursuant to .the stipulation, an order was drafted which provided that all rights,

interest and title to the Real Property were to be awarded to Plaintiffs.
17.

Discussions ensued as to the form of the order with Defendants indicating a

preference for a monetary judgment. Further discussions were had as to whether a monetary
judgment would be sufficient for settlement purposes and the Plaintiffs assert that an
agreement among the parties was reached which provided that the money judgment would be
amended if necessary to satisfy the parties' intent.
18.

A monetary judgment against the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust was

entered by this Court on December 1, 1995. The entire language of the judgment states as
follows:
This matter came before the Court for entry of judgment
against Defendant Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust.
The Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that judgment is entered against the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Trust in the amount of 5200,000. Said judgment
shall bear interest at the rate of 9.22% until such time as the
judgment is fully collected.
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19.

At the same time, on December 1, 1995, the Court entered an Order of

Dismissal, dismissing this litigation with prejudice.
20.

Plaintiffs' judgment has never been docketed or filed in Utah County.

21.

Approximately five months later, in May 1996, Plaintiffs commenced an action

in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, seeking title to the Real Property.
In the Fourth District action, Plaintiffs asserted that as a consequence of the recording of the
Lis Pendens, Plaintiff First Western Corporation, had "a priority position in the amount of its
judgment of $200,000" and that the Court should enter an order quieting title to the property
in Plaintiff.
22.

Wagner and Lincoln were named as defendants in the action and filed their

answer in the Fourth District on or about July 1, 1996.
23.

On July 9, 1996, Wagner and Lincoln's counsel wrote Plaintiffs' counsel setting

forth various theories and analyses as to why Plaintiffs' claim in the Founh District action was
not meritorious.
24.

Included in those analyses was the observation by Wagner and Lincoln that

Plaintiffs had taken judgment against the "Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust" in the Third
District action. Wagner and Lincoln asserted that a trust was not an artificial person in the
same sense that a corporation, a partnership, or an LLC is an artificial person, but rather is a
property interest in which the legal title to the property is vested in a trustee, who has
equitable duties to hold and manage the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries. See
Sharp v. Riekhof, 141 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1987). Wagner and Lincoln further asserted that the
judgment against the u Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust" was a judgment against a property
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interest not capable of holding title to real property and that the judgment therefore, could not
be a lien upon real property, record title of which was in the name of the trustees.
25.

In a letter to Wagner and Lincoln's counsel dated October 21, 1996, Plaintiffs'

counsel responded that he was in the process of preparing the necessary legal responses "to
identify what I see as problems in the presentation set forth in your July 9, 1996 letter/'
26.

Unknown to Wagner and Lincoln, on the same day, October 21, 1996,

Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment which is presently before the
Court.
27.

Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend and/or to Correct Judgment was apparently filed

in response to the positions taken by Wagner and Lincoln in the Fourth District action.
28.

In Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion To Amend and/or to Correct

Judgment, Plaintiffs' request that the judgment be amended to enter judgment against the
trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable Trust.
29.

At the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion To Amend and/or to Correct Judgment,

Plaintiffs submitted a proposed Amended Judgment. The proposed Amended Judgment
however, reads as follows:
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed, that judgment is
entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Trust.
Plaintiffs are awarded as judgment, all of Defendant Julie C.
Thomas Irrevocable Family Trust's rights and interest in the
property located at the street address commonly referred to as
162 N. 1400 E., Pleasant Grove, Utah, more particularly
described as follows:
[metes and bounds legal description omitted].
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The Court takes judicial notice of that Lis Pendens filed by
Plaintiffs with the Utah County Recorder's office, entry no.
56750 book no. 3024, page 251 and affirms that the issue of
title, ownership and control of the property identified therein
has been determined in favor of the Plaintiffs in this action.
30.

After October 23, 1997, further correspondence was had between Wagner and

Lincoln's counsel and Plaintiffs' counsel pertinent to the Fourth District action.
31.

Ultimately on May 2, 1997, Wagner and Lincoln as Defendants in the Fourth

District action filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asserting three theories; 1) that
Plaintiffs had no lien on the Utah County property because no judgment had been docketed in
Utah County, 2) that Plaintiffs' Lis Pendens did not afford its judgment of priority over
Wagner and Lincoln's interest because Plaintiffs' interest was a money judgment, and 3) that
Plaintiffs' judgment against the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable trust was a judgment against a
property interest not capable of holding title to real property and was not a lien upon real
property, record title of which was in the trustees of the trust.
32.

In response to Wagner and Lincoln's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition on May 27, 1996, as well as a motion to stay
dispositive proceedings in the Fourth District action, pending the resolution of the Motion To
Amend and/or to Correct Judgment then pending before this Court.
33.

It was at this time, May 27, 1996, that Wagner and Lincoln first learned of

Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend and/or to Correct Judgment which had been filed by Plaintiffs
eight months prior.
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34.

After learning of the Motion, on August 20, 1997, Wagner and Lincoln filed

their Motion To Intervene in this action in the Third District for the purpose of opposing
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or Correct Judgment.
35.

Wagner's and Lincoln's motion was briefed and oral arguments were heard on

the Motion to Intervene on September 29, 1997.
36.

On October 31, 1997, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision denying

Wagner's and Lincoln's Motion To Intervene.
37.

On November 3, 1997, Wagner and Lincoln filed a Motion To Reconsider the

Court's October 31, 1997, decision. That motion was also briefed, and oral arguments on
Wagner and Lincoln's Motion to Reconsider were heard February 17, 1998.
38.

In ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, the Court set aside the October 31,

1997, Memorandum Decision and granted Wagner and Lincoln Services leave to intervene.
39.

Thereafter, further briefing on the Motion to Amend and/or to Correct

Judgment was submitted to the Court by Plaintiffs and Intervenors.
40.

In addition to the memoranda filed by Intervenors, Intervenors filed the

Affidavit of Intervenor John D. Wagner and the Affidavit of John Martin Aldrige, the
President of First Colony Mortgage Corporation, the mortgage banker which originated
Lincoln Services' loan.
41.

The Affidavit of John D. Wagner states that on or about November 4, 1992,

Mr. Wagner paid for and purchased the real property subject of this lawsuit for a purchase
price of $122,500, that the purchase price was borrowed from First Colony Mortgage, and
that the loan was assigned from First Colony Mortgage to Lincoln Services Corporation.
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42.

The Affidavit further states that at the time Mr. Wagner purchased the property

he was not aware of any claim asserted against the property by First Western Corporation or
National Fund, Inc. More particularly, paragraph 10 of Mr. Wagner's Affidavit states as
follows:
10. No person, including the trustees of the Julie C. Thomas
Irrevocable Family Trust, or any person at First Colony
Mortgage or any other person, represented, or told me that
First Western Corporation or National Fund, Inc., claimed an
interest in the property. I did not see any document of any
nature whatsoever, which indicated that First Western
Corporation or National Fund, Inc., claimed an interest in the
property. At the time I purchased the property I had never
heard of, and was not aware that a corporation named First
Western Corporation, or a corporation named National Fund,
Inc., even existed.
11. I first learned of First Western's claim to my property in
June 1996, when I was served with a summons and
complaint in the Fourth District Court action. Prior to that
time I had no knowledge of any claim against the property by
any person.
43.

The Affidavit of John Martin Aldridge in pertinent part states:
From November 4, 1992 [the date of closing] until March 12,
1998 [the approximate date Mr. Aldridge signed his
Affidavit], I had no knowledge of any entity known by the
name of First Western Corporation nor of any entity known
by the name of National Fund, Inc. Before March 12, 1998,
I had no knowledge that First Western Corporation or
National Fund, Inc. asserted a claim against this property.

44.

Oral arguments on Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or Correct Judgment were

heard by the Court on December 14, 1998. At the conclusion or oral arguments, the Court
took the matter under advisement. Subsequently, the Court issued its Minute Entry dated
December 17, 1998.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- Bona Fide Purchaser Analysis/Iis Pendens Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and after consideration of the memoranda
in support and in opposition, the authorities, and analyses therein, as well as at oral argument,
the Court hereby concludes as follows:
45.

In this case Wagner took title to the real property in question by way of a

warranty deed recorded on November 4, 1992. Lincoln Services' deed of trust was also
recorded on November 4,. 1992. The Court concludes that even though Plaintiffs' Lis Pendens
was recorded approximately two weeks earlier, on October 23, 1992, Intervenors did not have
constructive notice of Plaintiffs' claims to the Real Property. Based upon the Affidavits of
John D. Wagner and John Martin Aldridge, the Court further concludes that Intervenors had
no actual notice or knowledge of Plaintiffs' claims to the real property.
46.

The Court concludes that in seeking only a money judgment, and due to the

absence in the Third Amended Complaint of any reference to, or description of, the Real
Property, the recording of the Lis Pendens is ineffective to give notice of Plaintiffs' claims to
the Real Property.
47.

The Court concludes consistent with its order of March 12, 1998, that the sole

purpose of recording a Lis Pendens is to give constructive notice of the pendency of the
proceeding; that the only foundation for the Lis Pendens is the underlying action; that the Lis
Pendens has no existence independent of the underlying action; and that the Lis Pendens is
only constructive notice of those facts apparent on the face of the pleadings. Hansen v.
Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). In this case the Third Amended Complaint seeks a
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money judgment and makes no claim to title, ownership, or possession of the real property
subject of the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens is therefore not effective to impart constructive
notice of Plaintiffs' claim to title, ownership, or possession of the real property in question.
48.

Consistent with Bush v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432 (D. Utah 1992), and Hamilton v.

Smith, 808 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1986), the Court concludes that the Third Amended Complaint
seeks monetary damages only. Utah law does not allow for the filing of a Lis Pendens in
cases seeking a money judgment.
49.

Accordingly, because Intervenors took their respective interests in the real

property without notice, or knowledge of, Plaintiffs' claims and because Intervenors gave
value, Intervenors satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of bona fide purchaser. The Utah
Supreme Court has defined a bona fide purchaser in the case of Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d
1188 (Utah 1993), wherein the Court stated u[a] bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable
consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse
claim of another's outstanding rights to the seller's title/' Id. at 1197. In Baldwin the Court
noted that if the purchaser is bona fide, the purchaser's interest in the property cannot be
affected, even if the grantor took title to the property through a fraudulent conveyance. Id.;
See also 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 308 (1996).
50.

Further, even if Lincoln Services cannot be construed as a "purchaser,"

Lincoln's interest in the real estate as a mortgagee is protected as a result of the "Shelter
Rule." The Shelter Rule provides that transferees from bona fide purchasers are protected by
their transferor's bona fides. 77 Am. Jur. Vendors and Purchasers § 509 (1997); 92 C.J.S.
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Vendors and Purchasers § 360 (1955 as updated 1997); Sun Valley Land and Minerals v. Bur,
853 P.2d 607 (Idaho App. 1993).
51.

The bona fides of Intervenors preclude the Court from granting the requested

relief as against the interests of Intervenors.
- Standing 52.

Based upon their bona fides, Intervenors have standing to assert the defenses

raised in their memoranda in opposition to the Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court has established three standards for determining whether a litigant has
standing. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). In this
case, Intervenors satisfy two of the three alternative standards of Terracor. First, as owner
and mortgagee of the real property in question, Intervenors have a personal stake in the
outcome of the dispute. Should the requested relief be granted, Intervenors would be divested
of their interests in the property in question. Second, because the Defendants in this action
conveyed the real property to Intervenors on November 4, 1992, Defendants have divested
themselves of any interest in the realty, and no other party has a greater stake in the outcome
of the issues. As consequence, it is unlikely that these issues will be raised by the Defendants.
Cf Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988) (holding that a
party lacked standing because the party had previously quit claimed her interest); Wade v.
Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990) (holding a defendant did not have standing because he
held no interest in the subject real property).
53.

Further, this matter involves title to real property and Intervenors are seeking to

protect their interest in such property. In this regard, Doyle vs. West Temple Terrace
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Company, 135 P. 103, 105 (Utah 1913), is instructive. Doyle holds that a party seeking to
protect an interest in real estate "may assail a judgment, deed or any other instrument affecting
his title, for the reason that such judgment or instruments are void, upon the ground of fraud
or for any other legal reason." Accordingly, Tntervenors have standing to challenge the
proposed amended judgment and to assert the theories addressed below.
54.

The cases relied upon by Plaintiff on the question of standing are not

persuasive. Unlike the attorneys in Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin vDES, 878 P.2d 1191
(Utah 1994), in this case, Intervenors are the only parties with an interest in the property.
And, as evidenced by the Defendants' lack of participation in these proceedings, there is no
other party in a better position to raise the issues and no party has a greater interest in the
outcome than Intervenors. In Aldrich, the Court held that the former client had the greater
interest in the issue presented and should have raised the issue, rather than his attorneys. Id.
at 1194.
55.

Neither is Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), helpful to Plaintiffs'

position. This is because in Shelledy, unlike this case, the Court held that the plaintiff did not
have standing to assert a governmental immunity defense because the plaintiff was on "record
notice" of defendant's sheriff deed at the time the plaintiff took title. Id. at 790. This Court
has previously determined that Intervenors did not have notice of Plaintiffs' claims to the real
property. Therefore, Shelledy is distinguished from the present case.
56.

Accordingly, Intervenors have standing to assert the defenses set forth below.
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- Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 57.

Plaintiffs' motion is not appropriate under Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P. Rule 60(a) is

intended to correct clerical mistakes in judgments. A clerical mistake is "a type of mistake or
omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which does not invoke a
legal decision or judgment by an attorney." Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co.,
669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) (citing In re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 F. Supp.
605, 607 (1967)). Whether to pursue a money judgment or a decree quieting title is a
substantive legal decision to which Rule 60(a) does not apply. See E.G. Britt v. Whitmire, 956
F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding rule governing clerical mistakes does not apply to a motion
seeking correction of substantive judgment or error that affects the substantive rights of the
parties).
58.

Rule 60(a) therefore does not provide a basis for Plaintiffs' motion because

Plaintiffs seek, 1) to change a money judgment to an order establishing title in Plaintiffs or in
the alternative, 2) to name as judgment debtors the trustees, over whom the Court does not
have jurisdiction (see below). The requested relief would be a substantive modification of the
judgment which is inappropriate under Rule 60(a). State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah
App. 1991); Richards v. Siddoway, 471 P.2d 143 ( Utah 1970).
- Rule 59(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59.

Neither is relief under Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

appropriate. It is clear that Plaintiffs seek to amend the judgment by naming non-parties as
judgment debtors, or in the alternative, to change the money judgment to an order decreeing
the rights of parties in real property. A motion to alter or amend judgment shall be served no
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later than ten (10) days after entry of the judgment. U.R.C.P. 59(e). Plaintiffs' motion was
served eleven months after the entry of judgment and therefore is not timely under Rule 59(e).
- Rule 60(b)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60.

Entering into an ill-advised stipulation without fully understanding its

consequences is "correctly characterized as mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect under
Rule 60(b)(1)." Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 386 (Utah App.
1991). Accordingly, a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
would be an appropriate basis for Plaintiffs' motion. However, a motion under Rule 60(b)(1)
must be made within three months of the entry of the judgment. Plaintiffs' motion was filed
eleven months after the entry of judgment and is therefore not timely under Rule 60(b)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
- Res Judicata 61.

On December 1, 1995, the Court entered a final judgment in response to

Plaintiffs' claims. At the same time, the Court entered an order of dismissal, and the time for
appeal has run. The doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes Plaintiffs from re-litigating
the same claims in an attempt to re-fashion the remedy sought. See Richards v. Siddoway, 471
P.2d 143, 147 (Utah 1976) (despite attempt to claim a clerical error in a judgment, there was
no clerical error and because the time had run for bringing motion to amend the judgment, the
judgment was res judicata); see also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731
(Utah I995)(res judicata or claim preclusion prevents parties or their privies from relitigating
a claim that was once litigated on the merits and resulted in a final judgment). Not only does
the doctrine of res judicata preclude relitigation of claims previously litigated, but it also
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precludes the litigation of claims that could have been litigated in the prior action, but were
not. Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P, 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). Res
judicata applies to consent judgments and court approved settlements such as this case. Id.
Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the granting of Plaintiffs' motion.
- Jurisdiction over the Trustees 62.

A review of the file in this matter reveals that Scott W. Collard and Christine

C. Lewis were never served in their capacities as trustees of the Julie C. Thomas Irrevocable
Trust. The file reveals that these persons were only served in their individual capacity.
Neither have the trustees entered a general appearance through a filing, motion, or a pleading.
Until service of process is accomplished a court does not have jurisdiction to proceed to a
judgment even though a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 62(b) Am. Jur. 2d
Process § 4 (1990). Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute
is deemed necessary, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the commencement
of the action which confers jurisdiction. Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971); see
also Garcia v. Garcia, 111 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (holding the requirements of Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to service of process, are jurisdictional). The Court
therefore lacks personal jurisdiction over the trustees and is precluded from entering a
judgment against them.
- Jurisdiction Over The Real Property 63.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the Utah County property. It is an established

rule that in order to confer jurisdiction upon a court to render a judgment, the subject matter
must be presented for the court's consideration in some mode sanctioned by law. 61(a) Am.
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Jur. 2d Pleadings § 2 (1981). It is through proper pleadings that the jurisdiction of the court
in a particular case is conferred. A party may not be granted relief in the absence of pleadings
to support the relief requested and a judgment based upon an issue not pleaded is a nullity. 46
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 2 (1994).
64.

The Third Amended Complaint makes no allegation as to the real property at

issue. The prayer in the Seventh Claim for Relief requests a money judgment.
Notwithstanding the changes that have been introduced by modern systems of pleadings, it still
remains the duty of the Plaintiffs to state their claim in their complaint. 61(a) Am. Jur.
Pleadings § 71 (1981). In the absence of such pleading, the court lacks jurisdiction over the
real property in question. In the absence of such jurisdiction, the requested relief cannot be
granted.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and/or to Correct Judgment dated October 21, 1996 is
hereby denied.

x,

Dated the ^~ day of

1999.
B>THE COURT:

rine E. Medley
istrict Court Judae
Approved as to form:

J?£j> /.
<

/

/

•

Shawn D. Turner
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copies of the foregoing Findings of¥act, Conclusions of Law and Order Pursuant to
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Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Shawn D. Turner
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER
4516 S. 700 East #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
David T. Aagard
Attorney at Law
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Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Robert McDonald
MCDONALD & WEST

3269 S. Main, #270
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Tom Seiler
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER
80 N. 100 East
Provo, UT 84606

SHERMAN C. YOUNG
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ADDENDUM B
DETERMTNATTVE STATUTES AND RULES

UT ST § 75-7-402, Powers of trustees conferred by this part
more agents to perform any act of administration,
whether or not discretionary;
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or
proceedings for the protection of trust assets and
of the trustee in the performance of his duties;
and
(aa) execute and deliver all instruments which
will accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the
powers vested in the trustee.
(4) If a governing instrument or order requires
or authorizes investment in United States
government obligations, a trustee may invest in
those obligations, either directly or in the form of
securities or other interests, in any open-end or
closed-end
management " type
investment
company or investment trust registered under the
provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. Sections 80a-l through 80a-64
if:
(a) the portfolio of the investment company or
investment trust is limited to United States
government
obligations,
and
repurchase
agreements are fully collateralized by United
States government obligations; and
*24472 (b) the investment company or
investment trust takes delivery of the collateral
for any repurchase agreement either directly or
through an authorized custodian.
(5) The trustee may exercise the powers set
forth in this section and in the trust either in the
name of the trust or in the name of the trustee as
trustee, specifically including the right to take
title to encumber or convey assets, including real
property, in the name of the trust.
This
subsection applies to a trustee's exercise of trust
powers both prior to and after the effective date
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of this subsection. After the effective date of this
subsection, for recording purposes, the name and
address of at least one trustee must be included
on all recorded documents affecting real property
to which the trust is a party in interest.
(6)(a) If the fair market value of a trust is less
than $25,000, the trustee may terminate the trust
by the following procedure:
(i) the trustee shall determine a plan of
distribution that agrees, as nearly as possible,
with the trust's dispositive plan;
(ii) the trustee shall give notice to all interested
persons of its intent to distribute the assets in
accordance with the plan unless an interested
person objects within 20 days after the date of
the notice;
(iii) if no objection is received within 20 days
after the date of the notice, the trustee shall
proceed to distribute the trust assets in
accordance with the plan;
(iv) if the trustee receives a written objection to
the plan within 20 days of the date of the notice,
the trustee shall not distribute the assets of the
trust, but may then petition the court for an order
authorizing distribution in accordance with the
plan. The court shall have plenary authority to
approve, modify, or reject the trustee's petition.
(b) The existence of a spendthrift or similar
provision shall not effect the trustee's powers
under this subsection unless the trust instrument
specifically provides that the trustee shall not
have the power to terminate the trust.
As last amended by Chapter I "9. Laws of Utah 1992

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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RCP Rule 8, RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS
*17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART m. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS,
AND ORDERS
Current with amendments received through
11-1-98

RULE 8- GENERAL
PLEADINGS

RULES

OF

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.
Relief in the alternative or of several different
types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall
state in short and plain terms his defenses to each
claim asserted and shall admit or deny the
averments upon which the adverse party relies.
If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment, he shall so state and this has the effect
of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied. When a
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part
or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify
so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader
intends in good faith to controvert all the
averments of the preceding pleading, he may
make his denials as specific denials of designated
averments or paragraphs, or he may generally
deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits;
but, when he does so intend to controvert all its
averments, he may do so by general denial
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses.

In pleading to a
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preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any
other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.
When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the
court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat
the pleadings as if there had been a proper
designation.
*18 (d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of
damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to
which no responsive pleading is required or
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct;
Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms
of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and
one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient
by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as he has
regardless of consistency and whether based on
legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All
statements shall be made subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
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RCP Rule 15, RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
*35 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS,
AND ORDERS
Current with amendments received through

RULE
15.
AMENDED
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

AND

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading-is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at
any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only
by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires. A party shall plead in
response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading
or within 10 days after service of the amended
pleading, whichever period may be the longer,
unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the
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pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever
the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions
or occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. Permission may be granted even
though the original pleading is defective in its
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the
court deems it advisable that the adverse party
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so
order, specifying the time therefor.
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RCP Rule 24, RULE 24. INTERVENTION
*51 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24

WESTS UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART IV. PARTIES
Current with amendments received through
11-1-98
RULE 24. INTERVENTION
(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when
the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
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(b) Permissive Intervention.
Upon timely
application anyone may be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a statute confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When
a party to an action relies for ground of claim or
defense upon any statute or executive order
administered by a governmental officer or
agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement, or agreement issued or made
pursuant to the statute or executive order, the
officer or agency upon timely application may be
permitted to intervene in the action.
In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene
shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties
as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied
by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense
for which intervention is sought.
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RCP Rule 59, RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT
*126 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
Current with amendments received through
11-1-98

RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS
OF JUDGMENT
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on
a motion for a new trial in an action tried without
a jury, the court may open the judgment if one
has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court,
or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which he could
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not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
~(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the
application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be
supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a
new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has
10 days after such service within which to serve
opposing affidavits. The time within which the
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served
may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good
cause shown or by the parties by written
stipulation.
The court may permit reply
affidavits.
*127 (d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than
10 days after entry of judgment the court of its
own initiative may order a new trial for any
reason for which it might have granted a new
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment.
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RCP Rule 60, RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
*128 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART Vn. JUDGMENT
Current with amendments received through
U-I-98
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR
ORDER
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such
mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes;
Inadvertence;
Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated
intrinsic
or
extrinsic),
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misrepresentation or other "misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),
not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of
a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
[Amended effective April 1, 1998.]
Advisory Committee Note
*129 The 1998 amendment eliminates as
grounds for a motion the following: "(4) when,
for any cause, the summons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action." This basis for a
motion is not found in the federal rule. The
committee concluded the clause was ambiguous
and possibly in conflict with rules permitting
service by means other than personal service.
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Utah Code § 75-7-402

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 75. UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE
CHAPTER 7. TRUST
ADMINISTRATION
PART 4. UNIFORM TRUSTEES1
POWERS PROVISIONS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§ 75-7-402. Powers of trustees conferred
by this part
(1) From time of creation of the trust until final
distribution of the assets of the trust, a trustee has
the power to perform, without court
authorization, every act which a prudent man
would perform for the purposes of the trust,
including the powers specified in Subsection (3).
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the
powers granted by this part, a trustee has a duty
to act with due regard to his obligation as a
fiduciary, according to the standard set forth in
Section 75-7-302.
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to
Subsections (1) and (2) to:
(a) collect, hold, and retain trust assets received
from a trustor until, in the judgment of the
trustee, disposition of the assets should be made.
The assets may be retained even though they
include an asset in which the trustee is personally
interested;
(b) receive additions to the assets of the trust;
(c) continue
any business
incorporation,
form of the
enterprise;

or participate in the operation of
or other enterprise and effect
dissolution, or other change in the
organization of the business or

(d) acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset
in which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds
an undivided interest;
(e) invest and reinvest trust assets in bonds,
notes, stocks of corporations regardless of class,
real estate or any interest in real estate, interests
in trusts or in any other property, or individual
interests in property wherever it is located;
(f) invest and reinvest trust assets in securities
of an open-end or closed-end type management
investment company or investment trust which is
registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, as amended, including securities of any
investment company or investment trust that is
affiliated with or a subsidiary of the trustee, or to
which the trustee or its affiliate or subsidiary
provides a service such as that of an investment
advisor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar,
sponsor, distributor, manager, or otherwise, for
which it receives reasonable remuneration for
such service;
*24470 (g) deposit or invest trust funds in a
bank, including a bank operated by the trustee;
(h)(i) acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or
on credit, at public or private sale;
(ii) manage, develop, improve, exchange,
partition, change the character of, or abandon a
trust asset or any interest therein; and
(iii) encumber, mortgage, or pledge a trust asset
for a term within or extending beyond the term
of the trust, in connection with the exercise of
any power vested in the trustee;
(i) make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or
alterations in buildings or other structures, or
demolish any improvements, raze existing or
erect new party walls or buildings;
(j)(i) subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to
public use;
(ii) make or obtain the vacation of plats and
adjust boundaries;
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(iii) adjust differences in valuation on exchange
or partition by giving or receiving consideration;
or
(iv) dedicate easements to public use without
consideration;
(k) enter, for any purpose into a lease as lessor
or lessee with or without an option to purchase
or renew for a term within or extending beyond
the term of the trust;
(1) enter into a lease or arrangement for
exploration and removal of minerals or other
natural resources or enter into a pooling or
unitization agreement;
(m) grant an option involving disposition of a
trust asset, or take an option for the acquisition
of any asset;
(n) vote a security, in person or by general or
limited proxy;
(o) pay calls, assessments, and any other sums
chargeable or accruing against or on account of
securities;
(p) sell or exercise stock subscription or
conversion rights, consent, directly or through a
committee or other agent, to the reorganization,
consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation
of a corporation or other business enterprise;
(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or
in other form without disclosure of the trust so
that title to the property may pass by delivery,
but the trustee is liable for any act of the
nominee in connection with the property so held;
(r) insure the assets of the trust against damage
or loss and the trustee against liability with
respect to third persons;
(s)(i) borrow money to be repaid from trust
assets or otherwise;
(ii) advance money to be repaid from trust
assets or otherwise; or
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(iii) advance money for the protection of the
trust, and for all expenses, losses, and liabilities
sustained in the administration of the trust or
because of the holding or ownership of any trust
assets, for which advances with any interest the
trustee has a lien on the trust assets as against the
beneficiary;
*24471 (t)(i) pay or contest any claim;
(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by
compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and
(iii) release, in whole or in part, any claim
belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim
is uncollectible;
(u) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the
trustee, and other expenses incurred in the
collection, care, administration, and protection of
the trust;
(v) allocate items of income or expense to
either trust income or principal, as provided by
law, including creation of reserves out of income
for depreciation, obsolescence, amortization, or
for depletion in mineral or timber properties;
(w) notwithstanding the provisions of Section
75-5-102, pay any sum distributable to a
beneficiary under legal disability, without
liability to the trustee, by paying the sum to the
beneficiary or by paying the sum for the use of
the beneficiary either to a legal representative
appointed by the court, or if none, to a relative;
(x) effect distribution of property and money in
divided or undivided interests and adjust
resulting differences in valuation;
(y)(i) employ persons, including attorneys,
auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if
they are associated with the trustee, to advise or
assist the trustee in the performance of his
administrative duties:
(ii) act without independent investigation upon
their recommendations: and
(iii) instead of acting personally, employ one or

Copyright (c) west Croup 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT ST § 75-7-402, Powers of trustees conferred by this part
more agents to perform any act of administration,
whether or not discretionary;
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or
proceedings for the protection of trust assets and
of the trustee in the performance of his duties;
and
(aa) execute and deliver all instruments which
will accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the
powers vested in the trustee.
(4) If a governing instrument or order requires
or authorizes investment in United States
government obligations, a trustee may invest in
those obligations, either directly or in the form of
securities or other interests, in any open-end or
closed-end
management type investment
company or investment trust registered under the
provisions of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64
if:
(a) the portfolio of the investment company or
investment trust is limited to United States
government
obligations,
and
repurchase
agreements are fully collateralized by United
States government obligations; and
*24472 (b) the investment company or
investment trust takes delivery of the collateral
for any repurchase agreement either directly or
through an authorized custodian.
(5) The trustee may exercise the powers set
forth in this section and in the trust either in the
name of the trust or in the name of the trustee as
trustee, specifically including the right to take
title to encumber or convey assets, including real
property, in the name of the trust.
This
subsection applies to a trustee's exercise of trust
powers both prior to and after the effective date
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of this subsection. After the effective date of this
subsection, for recording purposes, the name and
address of at least one trustee must be included
on all recorded documents affecting real property
to which the trust is a party in interest.
(6)(a) If the fair market value of a trust is less
than $25,000, the trustee may terminate the trust
by the following procedure:
(i) the trustee shall determine a plan of
distribution that agrees, as nearly as possible,
with the trust's dispositive plan;
(ii) the trustee shall give notice to all interested
persons of its intent to distribute the assets in
accordance with the plan unless an interested
person objects within 20 days after the date of
the notice;
(iii) if no objection is received within 20 days
after the date of the notice, the trustee shall
proceed to distribute the trust assets in
accordance with the plan;
(iv) if the trustee receives a written objection to
the plan within 20 days of the date of the notice,
the trustee shall not distribute the assets of the
trust, but may then petition the court for an order
authorizing distribution in accordance with the
plan. The court shall have plenary authority to
approve, modify, or reject the trustee's petition.
(b) The existence of a spendthrift or similar
provision shall not effect the trustee's powers
under this subsection unless the trust instrument
specifically provides that the trustee shall not
have the power to terminate the trust.
As last amended by Chapter 179. Laws of Utah 1992.
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Utah Code § 78-2a-3
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PARTI. COURTS
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF
APPEALS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs
and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction,
including
jurisdiction
of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission,
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed
by the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and
Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;

(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal
sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving
.domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division,
child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and
paternity;
*25945 (i) appeals from the Utah Military
Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion
only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original
appellate review and determination any matter
over which the Court of Appeals has original
appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Laus 1994 c 13 Laws 1995, c 299 § •/".
ejf May 1. 1995, Laws 1996 c. 159, § 19, ejf July 1,
1996. Laws 1996, c 198 §49 eff July L 1996
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Utah Code § 78-3-4
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PARTI. COURTS
CHAPTER 3. DISTRICT COURTS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§ 78-3-4. Jurisdiction—Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the
Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all
extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and
decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over
matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the
rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all
matters properly filed in the circuit court prior to
July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction
to adjudicate trials de novo of the judgments of
the justice court and of the small claims
department of the district court.

(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments,
and decrees of the district court are under
Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, and shall comply with the requirements of
that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district
court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B
misdemeanors,
class
C
misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial
jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit
court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries
of the municipality in which the district
courthouse is located and that municipality has
not formed a justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or
information covering a single criminal episode
alleging the commission of a felony or a class A
misdemeanor.
Amended by Laws 1993, c. 59; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 50,
eff.July 1, 1996; Laws 1997, c 216, § 2, eff. July 1. 1997;
Laws 1998. c. 313. § 1, eff July 1, 1998.
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